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EN-GENDERING ECONOMIC INEQUALITY
MICHELE E. GILMAN*
Abstract
We live in an era of growing economic inequality. Luminaries ranging from the President 
to the Pope to economist Thomas Piketty in his bestselling book Capital in the Twenty-
First Century have raised alarms about the disparity between the haves and the have-nots. 
Overlooked, however, in these important discussions is the reality that economic inequality 
is not a uniform experience; rather, its effects fall more harshly on women and minorities. 
With regard to gender, American women have higher rates of poverty and get paid less 
than comparable men, and their workplace participation rates are falling. Yet economic 
inequality is neither inevitable nor intractable. Given that the government creates the rules 
of the market, it is essential to analyze the government’s role in perpetuating economic 
inequality. 
This Article specifically examines the role of the Supreme Court in contributing to gender-
based economic inequality. The thesis is that the Supreme Court applies oversimplified 
economic assumptions about the market in its decision-making, thereby perpetuating 
economic inequality on the basis of gender. Applying insights of feminist economic theory, 
the Article analyzes recent Supreme Court jurisprudence about women workers, including 
Wal-Mart v. Dukes (denying class certification to female employees who were paid and 
promoted less than men), Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. (granting business owners 
the right to deny contraception coverage to female employees on religious grounds), and 
Harris v. Quinn (limiting the ability of home health care workers to unionize and thereby 
improve their working conditions). In these cases, the Court elevates its narrow view of 
efficiency over more comprehensive understandings, devalues care work, upholds harmful 
power imbalances, and ignores the intersectional reality of the lives of low-wage women 
workers. The Article concludes that the Court is eroding collective efforts by women to 
improve their working conditions and economic standing. It suggests advocacy strategies 
for reforming law to obtain economic justice for women and their families.
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INTRODUCTION
President Obama calls economic inequality the “defining challenge of our time.”1 Pope 
Francis decries “trickle-down theories which assume that economic growth, encouraged by 
a free market, will inevitably succeed in bringing about greater justice and inclusiveness 
in the world.”2 Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen asks whether growing economic 
inequality “is compatible with values rooted in our nation’s history, among them the high 
value Americans have traditionally placed on equality of opportunity.”3 Corporate America 
is also sounding the alarm, concerned that falling incomes will hurt profits and hinder 
economic growth.4 In short, economic inequality is firmly on the public agenda, as experts, 
policymakers, and presidential candidates debate its causes, consequences, and cures. 
Less attention is focused on the reality that not all groups experience inequality similarly. 
To the contrary, economic inequality falls most harshly on minorities and women.5 The 
*     Venable Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. Director, Civil Advocacy Clinic; Co-
Director, Center on Applied Feminism. B.A., Duke University; J.D., University of Michigan Law School. 
Thanks to participants at the AALS Workshop on Next Generation Issues on Sex, Gender, and the Law, as 
well as at the Workshop on Vulnerability at the Intersection of the Changing Firm and the Changing Family at 
Emory Law School for their insights. I am also grateful for comments from Dan Hatcher, Margaret Johnson, 
and Barbara White.
1     President Barack Obama, Remarks on Economic Inequality at the White House (Dec. 4, 2014) (transcript 
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/04/remarks-president-economic-mobility 
[https://perma.cc/M7QY-D4ML]).
2  Zachary A. Goldfarb & Michelle Boorstein, Pope Francis Denounces “Trickle-Down” Economic Theories 
in Sharp Criticism of Inequality, Wash. Post, Nov. 26, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/pope-francis-denounces-trickle-down-economic-theories-in-critique-of-inequality/2013/11/26/
e17ffe4e-56b6-11e3-8304-caf30787c0a9_story.html [https://perma.cc/83PJ-R54Y].
3  Pedro Nicolaci Da Costa, Janet Yellen Decries Widening Income Inequality, Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 2014, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/feds-yellen-says-extreme-inequality-could-be-un-american-1413549684 [https://
perma.cc/XBB6-EARX].
4  See Business Leaders Worry About Income Inequality And Revolution, Forbes (Sept. 9, 
2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/eriksherman/2014/09/09/business-leaders-worry-about-
income-inequality-and-revolution/ [https://perma.cc/5DY6-UAXP]; How Increasing Income 
Inequality is Dampening U.S. Economic Growth, and Possible Ways to Change the Tide, 
Standard & Poor’s Global Credit Portal (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.globalcreditportal.
com/ratingsdirect/renderArticle.do?articleId=1351366&SctArtId=255732&from=CM&nsl_
code=LIME&sourceObjectId=8741033&sourceRevId=1&fee_ind=N&exp_date=20240804-19:41:13;%20
http://time.com/3083100/income-inequality/ [https://perma.cc/X7SF-7C29].
5  On the racial wealth and income gap, see Rakesh Kochhar & Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality has Widened 
Along Racial, Ethnic Lines Since End of Great Recession, Pew Res. Ctr. (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.
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intersection of economic inequality with gender, as shaped and reinforced by law, is the 
focus of this Article.
Currently, the top 1% of households earns one-fifth of the nation’s income.6 Wealth 
inequality is even greater, as the top 1% of the distribution owns approximately 42% of the 
nation’s wealth.7 Meanwhile, a majority of Americans face stagnant wages, reduced social 
mobility, and higher job insecurity.8 The middle class is shrinking,9 while at the bottom of 
the economic barrel, nearly 15% of the population lives below the poverty line,10 where 
they struggle to meet basic needs such as food and housing.11 Economic inequality causes 
pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-recession/ [https://perma.cc/NWJ5-8V84]; 
Thomas Shapiro, Tatjana Meschede & Sam Osoro, The Roots of the Widening Racial Wealth Gap: Explaining 
the Black-White Economic Divide, Inst. on Assets & Soc. Pol’y (Feb. 2013), http://iasp.brandeis.edu/pdfs/
Author/shapiro-thomas-m/racialwealthgapbrief.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MB8-D9PK]. On gender and economic 
inequality, see Part I.B. infra.
6  See Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century 296 (2014).
7  See Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: Evidence 
from Capitalized Income Tax Data (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20645, 2014). The 
richest 0.1% holds 22% of the wealth; this group has driven the growth of wealth inequality. Id. at 22. For an 
explanation of the data, trends, and measurement of economic inequality, see Chad Stone et al., A Guide to 
Statistics on Historical Trends in Income Inequality, Ctr. on Budget Pol’y & Priorities (Feb. 20, 2015), 
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/11-28-11pov.pdf [https://perma.cc/DY7X-4LS9].  
8  See Ctr. for Am. Progress, Report of the Commission on Inclusive Prosperity 10 (Jan. 2015) 
(workers face stagnant wages despite corporate growth); Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Winner-Take-
All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—and Turned Its Back on the Middle Class 2, 
4 (2011).
9  See Keith Miller & David Madland, As Income Inequality Rises, America’s Middle Class Shrinks, Ctr. for 
Am. Progress (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/news/2014/12/18/101790/
as-income-inequality-rises-americas-middle-class-shrinks/ [https://perma.cc/7SJB-BF9N] (“As income 
inequality has steadily grown in the United States, the actual size of America’s middle class has shrunk.”); 17 
Things We Learned About Income Inequality in 2014, Atlantic (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/
business/archive/2014/12/17-things-we-learned-about-income-inequality-in-2014/383917/?single_page=true 
[https://perma.cc/27MT-M7N7] (“More of the middle class is migrating to the lower class due to stagnant 
incomes and the increased cost of living . . . ”). 
10  Carmen DeNavas-Walt & Bernadette D. Proctor, U.S. Census Bureau, Income and Poverty in the 
United States: 2013 12 (2014).
11  One study found that even under a conservative measure, 1.17 million children are in families living in 
extreme poverty, meaning they earn less than $2.00 a day. H. Luke Shaefer & Kathryn Edin, The Rise of Extreme 
Poverty in the United States, Pathways 28, 29 (Summer 2014), http://web.stanford.edu/group/scspi/_media/
pdf/pathways/summer_2014/Pathways_Summer_2014_SShaeferEdi.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MY5-PCR8].
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not only individual financial struggles, but it also harms the economy through “lower 
productivity, lower efficiency, lower growth, [and] more instability.”12 By contrast, nations 
with greater economic equality have more economic growth.13 Our growing economic 
divergence is also linked to social dysfunctions, ranging from high rates of infant mortality, 
to crime, and substance abuse; educational failures; and lower life expectancy—all of 
which impose their own costs.14 
Gender both generates economic inequality and magnifies its effects. For instance, 
women’s workplace participation is falling, thereby impacting family incomes.15 Women 
get paid less than men for the same work.16 Women are disproportionately poor and more 
likely to work in low-wage jobs with few benefits or employee protections.17 These trends 
are drags on the economy and limit household wealth and opportunities. However, this 
lamentable state of affairs is neither inevitable, nor impossible to reverse.
An important insight in understanding economic inequality is that it is rooted in market 
trends that arise within the context of state action and inaction.18 As Nobel Prize winning 
economist Joseph Stiglitz explains, inequality is not solely the result of market forces; 
rather, “government policies have been central to the creation of inequality in the United 
States.”19 For instance, the government establishes the playing field regarding unionization, 
12  Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality: How Today’s Divided Society Endangers Our Future 
117 (2012). See also Michele Gilman, A Court for the One Percent: How the Supreme Court Contributes to 
Economic Inequality, 2014 Utah L. Rev. 389, 398–401 (2014) (on the effects of economic inequality).
13  Ctr for Am. Progress, supra note 8, at 45 (noting that research by the International Monetary Fund 
shows that “higher levels of net income inequality . . . are negatively correlated with growth in gross domestic 
product per person”).
14  Kate Pickett & Richard Wilkinson, The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies 
Stronger 70, 81, 108–13, 134–37 (2009); see also Ctr. for Am. Progress, supra note 8, at 47–49 (discussing 
shorter life expectancies resulting from economic inequality).
15  See infra Part I.B.
16  Id.
17  Id.
18  Government in/action is intertwined with all the major contributors to economic inequality, including 
increased globalization and outsourcing of jobs, Ctr. for Am. Progress, supra note 8, at 11; technological 
advances that have replaced traditional middle-income jobs, id. at 11; a rise in part-time work with few benefits, 
id. at 11; the decline of unionization, id. at 12, 34; a less progressive tax system, id. at 37; and the rise of super-
salaries for super-managers that bear no relation to increased productivity, id. at 12, 35–36.
19  Stiglitz, supra note 12, at 6. 
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corporate governance, and competition laws, all of which relate to economic inequality.20 
Political scientists Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson similarly elucidate, “[g]overnment rules 
make the market, and they powerfully shape how, and in whose interests, it operates.”21 
As legal scholar Martha McCluskey notes, government’s role in economic inequality is an 
observation with a “long and articulate history,” but one that is muted by economic rhetoric 
that treats the market and state as separable.22
Current public policies favor the top 1% at the expense of the 99%. Wealthy and 
corporate interests have an outsized role in shaping the public agenda, due to the role of 
money in political campaigns and lobbying.23 Substantial evidence shows that Congress 
is responsive to the concerns of wealthy Americans, while dismissing those of the bottom 
90%.24 The Supreme Court has solidified these political trends in decisions such as Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission.25  
Less noticed, but equally problematic, the Supreme Court also contributes to gender-
based economic inequality.26 Thus, this Article examines the Supreme Court’s recent 
20  Id. at 57–58.
21  Hacker & Pierson, supra note 8, at 44; see also David Brady, Rich Democracies, Poor People: How 
Politics Explain Poverty 6 (2009) (a sociologist explains that “the distribution of resources in states and 
markets is inherently political”); Martin Gilens, Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and 
Political Power in America 251–52 (2014).
22  Martha T. McCluskey, Deconstructing the State-Market Divide: The Rhetoric of Regulation from Workers’ 
Compensation to the World Trade Organization, in Feminism Confronts Homo Economicus: Gender, Law, 
& Society 147, 148 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Terence Doughtery eds., 2005). 
23  See Gilman, supra note 12, at 400–01, 434–35 (summarizing research on influence of money in politics); 
Gilens, supra note 21, at 239–47 (Gilens states that “the role of money in politics is complex,” but clearly a 
factor in shaping policy and electoral outcomes).
24  See Larry M. Bartels, Unequal Democracy 5, 254–65 (2004); Gilens, supra note 21, at 70, 77–85. 
See also Yasmin Dawood, The New Inequality: Constitutional Democracy and the Problem of Wealth, 67 Md. 
L. Rev. 123, 125 (2007) (explaining how economic inequality was a factor in constitutional design).
25  Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that political spending is a form 
of political speech under the First Amendment and therefore the government may not restrict corporate or union 
spending on “electioneering communications” to support or oppose individual candidates in elections). See also 
Gilman, supra note 12, at 437–41 (discussing connection between Citizens United and economic inequality).
26  For a discussion of how the Supreme Court has reinforced economic inequality in the areas of education, 
redistribution, corporate law, and the political process, see Gilman, supra note 12.
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doctrine where gender and class intersect.27 It imports core insights from feminist economic 
theory into legal analysis to help understand the harm to women wrought by the mainstream, 
neoclassical economic models based on efficiency and individual self-interest to which the 
Court majority adheres. The thesis is that the Supreme Court either overtly or implicitly 
applies neoclassical economic assumptions in its decision-making, thereby perpetuating 
economic inequality on the basis of gender. 
Part I describes the current patterns of income and wealth inequality and explains 
how gender interplays with these trends. It also sets forth basic principles of feminist 
economic theory, which reveal how the market and assumptions about the market shape 
inequitable outcomes. In Parts II to IV, the Article focuses on three recent Supreme Court 
cases that limit the rights of women in the low-wage workforce. Each case bears out the 
observations of feminist economists. These cases are significant not only due to the sheer 
numbers of women workers impacted, but also because the workplace dynamics exemplify 
the chasm between the economic fortunes of the top 1% and everyone else. In Wal-Mart 
v. Dukes28 (discussed in Part II), the Court made it difficult, if not impossible, to challenge 
discriminatory pay and promotion policies that arise from discretionary personnel policies, 
which dominate the modern workplace. In Harris v. Quinn29 (discussed in Part III), the 
Court limited the ability of home health care workers to unionize and thereby improve 
their working conditions. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.30 (discussed in Part IV), 
the Court granted business owners the right to deny contraception coverage to female 
employees on religious grounds. Reflecting on these cases, this Article concludes that 
the Court overturns or interprets legislation designed to correct for market imperfections 
in favor of corporate preferences.31 In so doing, the Court fails to acknowledge its own 
hand in fostering economic and gender inequality. At the same time, the Court reinforces 
gender-based stereotypes about women workers that have long limited their economic 
opportunity. The Court’s benign view of the market and its biased view of women create a 
potent combination that results in further entrenchment of economic inequality for women.
27  Laura T. Kessler, Getting Class, 56 Buff. L. Rev. 915 (2008) (Kessler discusses the inattention of feminist 
legal theory to class: “By placing economically privileged, white, heterosexual women at the center of the 
analysis, such theories and strategies discount the experiences of many women and men.”).
28  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
29  Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
30  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
31  See Martha T. McCluskey, Razing the Citizen: Economic Inequality, Gender, and Marriage Tax Reform, 
in Gender Equality: Dimensions of Women’s Equal Citizenship 267 (Linda C. McClain & Joanne L. 
Grossman eds., 2012). 
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I. Economic Inequality and Gender
A. The Rise of Economic Inequality
The data on economic inequality is sobering and irrefutable. We currently have greater 
economic inequality than the Roaring Twenties, when income was concentrated in the 
hands of wealthy industrialists.32 After World War II, the nation enjoyed several decades of 
shared growth with stable income distributions, resulting from government policies such 
as the GI bill, which sent veterans to college, a progressive tax system, and a strong labor 
movement.33 However, since the late 1970s, the top 1% has been pulling away from the 
rest of the country.34 Thirty years ago, the top 1% earned 12% of the nation’s income; today 
their share is 21%.35 Wealth inequality is even starker, as a household in the top 1% holds 
225 times the wealth of the average American household.36
If the pie were growing for all Americans, this divergence might not be a concern. 
However, the bottom 90% is working harder with less to show for it.37 Wages have been 
stagnant for the bottom 70% of income earners since the 1970s.38 Meanwhile, the largest 
share of the nation’s economic growth has gone to the top 1%.39 While the wages of the top 
32  Benjamin I. Page & Lawrence R. Jacobs, Class War? 7 (2009); see also Frank Levy & Peter Temin, 
Inequality and Institutions in 20th Century America 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
13106, 2007), http://www.nber.org/papers/w13106 [https://perma.cc/7TRY-LQ6W] (describing the increase in 
income inequality from 1980 to 2005); Stone et al., supra note 7, at 11.
33  See Piketty, supra note 6, at 294; Stiglitz, supra note 12, at 11; Bartels, supra note 24, at 8–9; Levy 
& Temin, supra note 32, at 2 (holding that between 1980 and 2005, business sector productivity increased by 
67.4%, yet median weekly earnings of full-time workers rose only 14%).
34  See Stiglitz, supra note 12, at 11.
35  Id. at 11; Page & Jacobs, supra note 32, at 7.
36  See Stiglitz, supra note 12, at 2.
37  See Timothy Noah, The Great Divergence 176 (2012); Bartels, supra note 24, at 17–18.
38  Lawrence Mishel, Causes of Wage Stagnation, Econ. Pol’y Inst. 1 (Jan. 6, 2015), http://www.epi.org/
publication/causes-of-wage-stagnation/ [https://perma.cc/9AY7-KD8X].
39  See Ctr. for Am. Progress, supra note 8, at 104 (95% of post-recession income gains went to the 
top 1% of households). The causes of wage stagnation result from intentional policy choices including, “the 
abandonment of full employment as a main objective of economic policymaking, declining union density, 
various labor market policies and business practices, policies that have allowed CEOs and finance executives 
to capture ever larger shares of economic growth, and globalization policies.” Mishel, supra note 38. 
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1% grew 138% between 1979 and 2013, the bottom 90% saw only a 15% increase.40 To be 
sure, unemployment is falling as the United States emerges from the recession, yet wage 
growth for most workers remains weak, with the average hourly pay dropping.41 
In the book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, economist Thomas Piketty surveyed 
tax, income, and wealth data for numerous countries going back over two hundred years 
and concluded that economic inequality will continue to rise unless government takes 
affirmative redistributive steps.42 Piketty’s book was a surprise bestseller that brought 
increased attention to the issue of economic inequality due to its accessible recounting 
and synthesis of economic history and data from the United States, Europe, and other 
developed nations.43 In response to the book’s overwhelming attention and impact, feminist 
economists pointed out that economic inequality impacts some groups more harshly.44 
Indeed, inequality is more extreme for women and minorities. 
By essentializing economic inequality, Piketty and other economists ignore how 
“income distribution emanates from at least a tripartite structuring of labor and capital—by 
race, gender and class.”45 This criticism of course, is not aimed at Piketty alone. Since the 
1990s, feminist economists have challenged mainstream economics for ignoring the role 
of gender in the marketplace, which dooms any project for shared prosperity. As Professor 
Diane Perrons states, recognizing how social groups “experience wealth and poverty 
40  See Lawrence Mishel, Elise Gould & Josh Bivens, Econ. Policy Inst., Wage Stagnation in Nine 
Charts 5 (2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/charting-wage-stagnation/ [https://perma.cc/T3RZ-VCUS]. 
41  Id. at 6.
42  Piketty, supra note 6, at 20–22. He recommends a progressive global tax on capital. Id. at 471, 515.
43  For representative descriptions of the Pikettymania phenomenon, see Jia Lynn Yang, Here’s an Unlikely 
Bestseller: A 700-Page Book on 21st Century Economics, Wash. Post, Wonkblog (Apr. 22, 2014), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/04/22/heres-an-unlikely-bestseller-a-700-page-book-on-
21st-century-economics/ [https://perma.cc/YVY2-3TNR] (stating that the book sold out on Amazon.com and 
sold 80,000 copies in two months); Megan McArdle, Piketty’s Capital: An Economist’s Inequality Ideas Are 
All the Rage, Bus. Week (May 29, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-05-29/pikettys-capital-
economists-inequality-ideas-are-all-the-rage [https://perma.cc/73U9-PP9Y].
44  See Diane Perrons, Gendering Inequality: A Note on Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century, 65 Brit. 
J. Soc. 667 (2014) (explaining that “inequality is experienced differently depending not only on class, but also 
on other aspects of identity including gender”); Kathleen Geier, et al., How Gender Changes Piketty’s Capital in 
the Twenty-First Century, Nation, Curve Blog (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/blog/180895/how-
gender-changes-pikettys-capital-twenty-first-century [https://perma.cc/E3BS-XLPQ] (a group of economists 
debates Piketty’s book from a gender perspective).  
45  Geier, et al., supra note 44.
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differently is critical to informing the democratic deliberations that Piketty hopes will be 
capable of bringing about change.”46 This Article is part of a larger feminist project to bring 
gender into the discussion of economic inequality and vice versa.
B. Gender and Economic Inequality
Gender and economic inequality are interrelated. Countries with greater gender 
equality also have greater economic growth.47 In the United States, the post-war period 
from the 1950s to the 1970s was not only a time of overall economic growth, but also a 
time of increased gender equality, as women gained access to education, the workplace, 
reproductive justice, and protections against violence, among other advances. However, 
economic growth, for most Americans, and the progression of gender equity have stalled. 
There are four key trends in gender and economic equality: (1) women’s employment is 
essential to the economy, but declining; (2) women get paid less than comparably qualified 
men for equal work,48 (3) women are more likely than men to live in poverty, and (4) the 
economic realities of women vary sharply by class, even more so than those of men. Overall, 
despite advances in women’s political and civil citizenship, “[women] earn less than men, 
end up in occupational ghettos, bump up against glass ceilings, and find themselves, in 
relation to men, as poor as ever.”49
First, due to wage stagnation in the United States, the contributions of women workers 
46  Perrons, supra note 44, at 671. 
47  See Naila Kabeer & Luisa Natali, Gender Equality and Economic Growth: Is There a Win-Win?, Inst. Dev. 
Stud. 21, 34 (Feb. 2013), https://www.ids.ac.uk/files/dmfile/Wp417.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WPD-VXWE]; The 
World Bank, World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development 3–6 (2012), http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2012/Resources/7778105-1299699968583/7786210-1315936222006/
Complete-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3GL-7DGD]; Katrin Elborgh-Woytek, et al., Women, Work and 
the Economy: Macroeconomic Gains from Gender Equity, Int’l Monetary Fund (Sept. 2013), http://www.
imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2013/sdn1310.pdf [https://perma.cc/L8JD-HDH3]; Jonathan Woetzel et al., How 
Advancing Women’s Equality Can Add $12 Trillion to Global Growth, McKinsey Global Inst. (Sept. 2015), 
http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/employment-and-growth/how-advancing-womens-equality-can-
add-12-trillion-to-global-growth [https://perma.cc/US2X-UF42].
48  At the current pace, this divide will not be erased until 2058. See Inst. for Women’s Pol’y Research, 
The Status of Women in the States 2015: Employment and Earnings 7 (2015), http://statusofwomendata.
org/app/uploads/2015/02/EE-CHAPTER-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/82LK-KG2N].  
49  Michael B. Katz, Mark J. Stern & Jamie J. Fader, Women and the Paradox of Inequality in the Twentieth-
Century, 39 J. Soc. Hist. 65 (2005)
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are increasingly essential to their households’ well-being.50 Women’s entrance into the 
workforce in the latter half of twentieth century was a profound social and economic 
development.51 Still, the United States is unique among developed countries in that the 
participation of working-age women in the labor force has been declining,52 from a high of 
73% in 1999 to 69% today.53 This decline persists despite the fact that women’s wages have 
been rising compared to men’s over the last three decades.54 One cause is a lack of family-
friendly public policies, such as paid parental leave, affordable childcare, or flexibility for 
part-time workers.55 The United States is the only developed nation that does not guarantee 
paid parental leave.56 In fact, economists Francine Blau and Lawrence Kahn have estimated 
that if the United States had gender-friendly policies similar to those in European countries, 
women’s labor market participation would be as much as 7% higher.57 
50  See Noah, supra note 37, at 53; Hacker & Pierson, supra note 8, at 22; Susan Harkness, The Contribution 
of Women’s Employment and Earnings to Household Income Inequality: A Cross-Country Analysis 19 (June 
2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the University of Bath), http://www.lisdatacenter.org/conference/
papers/harkness.pdf [https://perma.cc/RKG2-AY6A] (without women’s earnings, income inequality would 
increase in the United States by forty-nine percent).
51  See Katz et al., supra note 49, at 67–68; June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage Markets: How 
Inequality Is Remaking the American Family 196 (2014).
52  See Ctr. for Am. Progress, supra note 8, at 72; Bureau of Labor Statistics, Women in the Labor 
Force: A Databook 1 (2014), http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQP5-H5TD]; 
Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, Female Labor Supply: Why is the US Falling Behind? 1–2 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18702, 2013) (noting that in the United States, federal law gives 
women only twelve weeks unpaid leave) [hereinafter Blau & Kahn, Female Labor Supply].
53  See Ctr. for Am. Progress, supra note 8, at 132; Mary Gregory, Gender and Economic Inequality, in 
The Oxford Handbook of Economic Inequality 284, 288 (Brian Nolan, Wiemer Salverda & Timothy M. 
Smeeding eds., 2011). 
54  See Patricia Cohen, Among the Poor, Women Feel Inequality More Deeply, N.Y. Times: Upshot (Aug. 
18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/19/upshot/among-the-poor-women-feel-inequality-more-deeply.
html?_r=0&abt=0002&abg=0 [https://perma.cc/D53X-8GCP]. 
55  Ctr. for Am. Progress, supra note 8, at 72, 134; Randy Albelda, Gender Impacts of the “Great 
Recession” in the United States, in Women & Austerity: The Economic Crisis and the Future for Gender 
Equality 82, 83 (Maria Karamessini & Jill Rubery eds., 2013) [hereinafter Albelda, Gender Impacts]. 
56  See Elaine McCrate, Employer-oriented Schedule Flexibility, Gender and Family Care, in Handbook of 
Research on Gender and Economic Life [hereinafter Handbook on Gender] 273 (Deborah M. Figart & 
Tonia L. Warnecke eds., 2013) (the United States lacks “even the most rudimentary forms of flexibility such as 
paid vacation days or sick leave”).
57  Blau & Kahn, Female Labor Supply, supra note 52, at 1, 7. Men fared worse than women in terms of job 
loss during the economic recession from 2007–2009, but fared better in the post-recession economy with larger 
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Second, the gender gap in pay—women make about seventy-eight cents to every dollar 
earned by men58—adversely impacts households and the national economy. While the gap 
shrank from approximately 60% in 1978 to around 78% today,59 it has been stubbornly 
hard to erase—particularly for women of color—with little improvement since 1990.60 As 
a result, “the economic fortunes of families typically remain disproportionately dependent 
on what dads earn, even when the moms work, too.”61 One cause of the gender gap is family 
status, meaning the employment interruptions that women experience due to childbearing 
and caregiving.62 
Occupational segregation also contributes to the gender gap. In 2010, 49% of men 
and 41.1% of women worked in an occupation where at least 75% of other workers 
were of the same gender.63 Occupations dominated by women, such as administrative 
support, are lower paid than comparable occupations held by men, such as construction or 
transportation.64 As women move into a formerly male profession, pay in that profession 
job growth. See Albelda, Gender Impacts, supra note 55, at 82–88.
58  See DeNavas-Walt & Proctor, supra note 10, at 7; see also Am. Ass’n of Univ. Women, The Simple 
Truth about the Gender Pay Gap: 2015 Edition 3 (2015), http://www.aauw.org/files/2015/02/The-Simple-
Truth_Spring-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/EA3F-FM6V].
59  See Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender Pay Gap: Have Women Gone as Far as They 
Can? 21 Acad. Mgmt. Persp. 7, 9 (2007) [hereinafter Blau & Kahn, Have Women Gone]; Gregory, supra 
note 53, at 296. The gap is larger for older women than for younger women; it is 95% for women ages 16–
24 and 75% for women ages 55–64. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Rep. No. 1031, 
Highlights of Women’s Earnings in 2010 9 (2011), http://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/womens-earnings/
archive/womensearnings_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/GY6K-HNBA]; see also Am. Ass’n of Univ. Women, 
supra note 58, at 11.
60  See Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The U.S. Gender Pay Gap in the 1990s: Slowing Convergence, 
60 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 45 (2007).
61  Noah, supra note 37, at 49.
62  Gregory, supra note 53, at 293; Blau & Kahn, Have Women Gone, supra note 59, at 10; John Iceland, 
Poverty in America: A Handbook 101 (3d ed. 2013).  
63  See Ariane Hegewisch & Hannah Liepmann, Occupational Segregation and the Gender Wage Gap in the 
US, in Handbook on Gender, supra note 56, at 200. While occupational segregation declined significantly 
during the 1970s and 1980s due to legal reforms and enforcement, further progress has not only slowed, but 
reversed. Id. See also Iceland, supra note 62, at 100 (“women’s work is typically accorded both lower status 
and lower earnings than occupations with high concentrations of men”).
64  U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Rep. No. 1034, Women in the Labor Force: 
A Databook 55–68 (2011), http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/8FCL-7UBV]. 
Men earn more than women even in female-dominated occupations, such as elementary school teachers. Id. 
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declines.65 Discrimination is an additional factor, as “women still earn less than similar 
men even when all measured characteristics are taken into account.”66 Affirmative evidence 
of discrimination includes “a well-documented ‘wage premium’ for married men that is 
not evident in the pay of married women; a wage penalty for mothers, but not fathers; and 
a penalty for women’s leaves based on the expectation that [women] will take longer and 
more frequent leaves than [men] typically do.”67 
There is a paradox that women have advanced quickly in the American workplace, but 
face a larger gender gap than in other developed nations.68 Women’s depressed earnings 
mean they have fewer financial assets, less savings for retirement or emergencies, and 
higher poverty rates.69 By contrast, some estimate that closing the gender gap would 
increase the United States’ gross domestic product by 5%,70 and halve the poverty rate.71
Third, women are disproportionately represented in the low-wage labor market,72 and 
at 59–67 (Table 18); Cf. Vivien Labaton, Five Myths About the Gender Pay Gap, Wash. Post (July 25, 2014) 
(occupational segregation is only partly to blame for the gap because “the pay gap is widest in some of the 
highest-paying fields,” such as medicine and law).
65  Asaf Levanon & Paula England, Occupational Feminization and Pay: Assessing Causal Dynamics Using 
1950-2000 U.S. Census Data, 88 Soc. Forces 865 (2009).  
66  Blau & Kahn, Have Women Gone, supra note 59, at 12. They estimate discrimination to account for about 
forty-one percent of the gap. Id.
67  Katherine T. Bartlett, Deborah L. Rhode & Joanna L. Grossman, Gender and the Law: Theory, 
Doctrine, Commentary 60 (6th ed. 2013). While the gap is sometimes attributed to women’s alleged 
preferences for working less, the reality is that women who worked full-time and year-round during at least 12 
of 15 consecutive years still earn only 64% of similarly situated men. See Stephen J. Rose & Heidi I. Hartmann, 
Still a Man’s Labor Market: The Long-Term Earnings Gap, Inst. For Women’s Pol’y Res. 10 (2004).
68  See Gregory, supra note 53, at 296.  
69  See Hegewisch & Liepmann, supra note 63, at 200.
70  Elborgh-Woytek, et al., supra note 47, at 4.
71  Heidi Hartmann, Jeffrey Hayes & Jennifer Clark, How Equal Pay for Working Women Would Reduce 
Poverty and Grow the American Economy, Inst. for Women’s Pol’y Res. 1, 4 (2014), http://www.iwpr.
org/publications/pubs/how-equal-pay-for-working-women-would-reduce-poverty-and-grow-the-american-
economy [https://perma.cc/5U4Q-LJGW].
72  Low-income is defined by researchers and policymakers as having “family income below 200 percent of 
the poverty line.” Randy Albelda, Low-wage Mothers on the Edge in the US, in Handbook on Gender, supra 
note 56, at 257, 259 [hereinafter Albelda, Low-wage Mothers].
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more likely than men to be poor.73 Nearly six in ten adults who live in poverty are women.74 
This disparity results from the lower employment and wage levels of women75 as well as 
women’s higher likelihood of heading single parent families.76 Minimum wage workers are 
more likely to be women. 
Single mothers are in a particularly precarious position; their poverty rate was 39.6% 
compared to 7.6% for families with children headed by a married couple.77 Single mothers 
face the “triple whammy” of earning less than men; earning less than other women; 
and serving in the dual role of caregiver and breadwinner.78 40% of single mothers are 
employed in low-wage work,79 and 12% of single mothers who work full-time, year-round 
nevertheless live in poverty.80 For our poorest women, welfare was reformed in 1996 
to require recipients to work, but the low-wage workplace has changed little to support 
their efforts, offering measly wages, few benefits, and a lack of scheduling flexibility.81 
Meanwhile, the social safety net catches fewer and fewer eligible families.82  
73  Joan Entmacher, et al., Insecure & Unequal: Poverty and Income among Women and Families 
2000–2013 1 (2014), http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/final_2014_nwlc_poverty_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8FGF-EXWS]. See also Gregory, supra note 53, at 285 (Women “remain underrepresented 
in prestige professions and ‘top jobs’; they typically receive lower pay; and they feature disproportionately 
among the low-paid. Equality of outcomes in the labor market has not been achieved.”); Albelda, Gender 
Impacts, supra note 55, at 83 (examining the “large share of female-headed households that disproportionately 
fill the bottom ranks”). 
74  Poverty rates are significantly higher for families headed by Black, Hispanic, and Native American 
single mothers. See Entmacher, et al., supra note 73, at 3. For these women of color, it is harder to obtain 
employment, their jobs are more likely to be low-paid, and their wages are depressed by both race and gender 
discrimination. See Marlene Kim, Race and Ethnicity in the Workplace, in Handbook on Gender, supra 
note 56, at 218, 219–26. For instance, the author’s study showed that “black women were underpaid 9 percent 
because of their race, 15 percent because of their gender, and 3 percent because of the intersection of both 
gender and race.” Id. at 231. 
75  See supra notes 50 to 67 and accompanying text.
76  See Iceland, supra note 62, at 99–100.  
77  See Entmacher, et al., supra note 73, at 4.
78  Albelda, Low-wage Mothers, supra note 72, at 257, 258.  
79  Id. at 257, 264.
80  See Entmacher, et al., supra note 73, at 4.  
81  See Albelda, Low-wage Mothers, supra note 72, at 257, 263, 267–68.
82  See Shaefer & Edin, supra note 11, at 29–30.
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Working poor women struggle to procure affordable childcare while enduring low 
pay, irregular and part-time hours, and lack of benefits.83 Often these women work as 
childcare providers for more affluent women, while unable to afford childcare for their 
own children.84 The United States’ low levels of governmental support for paid childcare 
“exacerbates the inequality among women through the privatization of care costs.”85 Due 
to societal gender norms, women provide the majority of unpaid household labor,86 and 
women’s care responsibilities subject them to discrimination in the workplace, where the 
ideal worker is defined by a male norm.87 Employers treat low-wage women workers as 
“unencumbered,” subjecting them to variable and unpredictable work hours, and placing 
women in a bind when it comes to caring for their own children.88  
Fourth, the life experiences of women vary sharply by class, mirroring the overall 
pulling away of the top 1%.89 One stark difference is that women in the top 1% live on 
average 10 years longer than those in the bottom 1%. 90 Moreover, the life expectancies of 
women in the bottom 40% are shrinking rather than improving.91  
Although women are living comfortably at the top, it is worth noting that even in the 
top 1%, women still lag behind men. In fact, the gender wage gap is actually largest for 
83  See Albelda, Gender Impacts, supra note 55, at 84; Ctr. for Am. Progress, supra note 8, at 133.
84  See Albelda, Gender Impacts, supra note 55, at 84.  
85  Id.
86  See Nelson, Gender and Caring, in Handbook on Gender, supra note 56, at 64.
87  See Heather Boushey, The Role of the Government in US Work-family Conflict, in Handbook on Gender, 
supra note 56, at 307, 309.  
88  See McCrate, supra note 56, at 279.
89  See Albelda, Gender Impacts, supra note 55, at 84. Lisa Pruitt explains that geography is also a powerful 
determinant of one’s class and gender experience, stating, “the culture wars are now largely being fought—at 
least rhetorically—across the rural-urban divide.” Lisa R. Pruitt, The Geography of the Class Culture Wars, 34 
Seattle U.L. Rev. 767, 772 (2011). See also generally Lisa R. Pruitt, Toward a Feminist Theory of the Rural, 
2007 Utah L. Rev. 421 (2007).
90  Raj Chetty et al., The Association Between Income and Life Expectancy in the United States, 2001-2014, 
315 J. Am. Med. Assoc. 1750 (2016).
91  See Josh Zumbrun, The Richer You Are the Older You’ll Get, Wall St. J., Apr. 18, 2014, http://blogs.wsj.
com/economics/2014/04/18/the-richer-you-are-the-older-youll-get/ [https://perma.cc/L4ZV-H5UT]. 
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women at the top of the income scale.92 The rise of overall economic inequality in the 
United States is due in part to a class of multi-million dollar earning supermanagers.93 They 
are mostly male.94 In 2012, executive officer positions at Fortune 500 companies were 
only 14% female, while 25% of these companies had no female executives at all.95 Among 
the superrich, women constitute only forty-two of the four hundred richest Americans, 
and of these women, thirty-eight accrued their wealth by inheriting from their fathers and 
husbands.96 In short, “[t]he glass ceiling is still there” at the top.97
All these trends are “economically inefficient and socially inequitable.”98 They result 
from public policies that are stuck in “an early twentieth-century mindset about who works 
and who cares, one that no longer reflects the ways that American families work and live.”99 
The lower tier of the economy is starting to look more and more like a gendered economy, 
where women are paid less and segmented into traditionally female occupations. This spells 
bad times ahead for both men and women. Indeed, due to stagnation in the labor market, 
women’s workplace disadvantages are spreading to low-wage men. These disadvantages 
92  See Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends, and Explanations 
3 (Inst. for the Study of Labor Discussion Paper No. 9656, 2016), http://ftp.iza.org/dp9656.pdf [https://perma.
cc/ZQD5-QBYK]. Relatedly, the pay gap for women in management-related occupations is seventy-four cents 
to every dollar earned by a similarly situated man. See Randy Albelda, Robert Drago & Steven Shulman, 
Unlevel Playing Fields: Understanding Wage Inequality and Discrimination (3d ed. 2010).
93  See Piketty, supra note 6, at 298–303. The rise of the super wealthy has serious consequences for society; 
it extends beyond “private luxury [to] public power.” David Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 Harv. 
L. Rev. 626, 640 (2014). As Grewal explains, the superrich “can buy media corporations and private military 
contractors; they can sway individual elections and determine electoral trends.” Id. at 640 (footnotes omitted). 
Through philanthropy, they can spend at levels rivaling governments “and thus reorient humanitarian, cultural, 
and scientific agendas to their personal priorities.” Id. “They can coopt state functions . . . through privatizations, 
special bailouts, and preferential treatment of various kinds, which socializes risk while privatizing profit.” Id. 
94  See Perrons, supra note 44, at 672.
95  Carbone & Cahn, supra note 51, at 64.
96  Noah, supra note 37, at 49.
97  See Fatih Guvenen, Greg Kaplan & Jae Song, The Glass Ceiling and the Paper Floor: Gender Differences 
Among Top Earners, 1981–2012 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 20560, 2014), 
https://fguvenendotcom.files.wordpress.com/2014/04/gks_top_earners_2014_wpsep2014.pdf [https://perma.
cc/34EX-NFCZ]. “[T]he shares of females in the top percentiles were below 15% for the top 0.1 percent, and 
below 20% for the second 0.9 percent.” Id. at 13.
98  Gregory, supra note 53, at 285. 
99  Boushey, supra note 87, at 307.
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“includ[e] stagnating male median wages, reduced men’s labour force participation, a 
reduction in the percentage of men with employment-based benefits, a decline in male 
breadwinners, and growth in men’s share in low-wage and part-time work.”100 In short, 
gender-based economic inequality is bad for everyone.
C. Feminist Economic Theory
The insights of feminist economic theory are helpful in expanding feminist legal 
analysis beyond gender to incorporate the relationship between gender, class and law. The 
field of feminist economics101 is a response to mainstream, or neoclassical, economics and its 
animating model that individuals are rational actors who seek to maximize their economic 
self-interest.102 This maximization occurs in markets “in which perfect competition prevails. 
In these markets, goods are exchanged for goods, with money serving only as a neutral 
intermediary in the exchange.”103 In this view, the outcome of transactions is efficient if 
one party is better off and no party is worse off—efficiency is the goal.104 “The market 
100  Albelda, Gender Impacts, supra note 55, at 98. Notably, among men, only those with college educations 
have seen their wages increase over the past four decades. Iceland, supra note 62, at 102.
101  On the history of the feminist economics movement, which began in the early 1990s, see Marianne A. 
Ferber & Julie A. Nelson, Beyond Economic Man, Ten Years Later, in Feminist Economics Today: Beyond 
Economic Man [hereinafter Feminist Economics] 2–11 (Marianne A. Ferber & Julie A. Nelson eds., 2003). 
“Feminist economics emerged from dissatisfaction with the mainstream model for all the elements of economic 
life left out and rendered invisible, particularly traditionally female responsibilities for housework, childcare, 
and broader care of the family and community.” Marilyn Power, A Social Provisioning Approach to Gender 
and Economic Life, in Handbook on Gender, supra note 56, at 7, 9. Feminist economics is one of several 
heterodox economics movements critical of inadequacies within neoclassical economics. See Robert Ashford, 
Socioeconomics and Professional Responsibilities in Teaching Law-Related Economic Issues, 41 San Diego 
L. Rev. 133, 137–38 (2004) (listing various schools of thought); Kenneth M. Casebeer & Charles J. Whalen, 
Taking Interdependence and Production More Seriously: Toward Mutual Rationality and a More Useful Law 
and Economics, 66 U. Miami L. Rev. 141, 142 (2001) (listing core critiques of heterodox economists).
102  See Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 2 (9th ed. 2014) (Describing economics as “the 
science of rational choice in a world—our world—in which resources are limited in relation to human wants. 
The task of economics, so understood, is to explore the implications of assuming that human beings are rational 
maximizers of their ends in life, their satisfactions—equivalently, their ‘self-interest’ . . . .”).
103  Charles R.P. Pouncy, Contemporary Financial Innovation: Orthodoxy and Alternatives, 51 SMU L. Rev. 
505, 541 (1998).
104  See Introduction, in Feminism Confronts Homo Economicus, supra note 22, at xiv. Note that the 
term “neoclassical economics” includes many strands and theories; this Article summarizes its foundational 
precepts. See Tony Lawson, What is this “School” Called Neoclassical Economics? Cambridge J. Econ. 1 
(2013) (the term neoclassical is “employed to denote a range of substantive theories and policy stances”).
Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 1732.1
becomes the instrument of allocation, and individual self-interested economic decisions 
collectively achieve an optimal societal equilibrium.”105 The law and economics movement 
applies these principles both to explain and improve law.106 In its decisions impacting 
working class women, the Supreme Court clings to neoclassical economic assumptions, as 
incorporated into law through the law and economics movement and its emphasis on using 
law to promote economic efficiency.107
Feminist economists assert that the neoclassical economic “models . . . often marginalized 
women’s experience, assumed away discrimination or differentials of power, or assumed 
that any observed differences were the outcome of ‘essential’ differences between men 
and women, and therefore were natural, inevitable, and even desirable.”108 Rather than 
105  Pouncy, supra note 103, at 541. 
106  As with neoclassical economics, the law and economics movement has an “array of literatures, 
submovements, and schools of thought.” Anita Bernstein, Whatever Happened to Law and Economics? 64 Md. 
L. Rev. 303, 305 (2005). Still, its major precepts hinge on rational choice, efficiency and/or wealth maximization, 
and faith in markets. Id. at 308–18. For background on how the law and economics movement gained a foothold 
within the legal academy despite considerable critique, see Thomas O. McGarity, A Movement, a Lawsuit, and 
the Integrity of Sponsored Law and Economics Research, 21 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 51, 61–62 (2010); Jon 
Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power 
Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 129, 139–47, 272–78 (2003). For the history of law and 
economics and its antecedents, see generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Law and Economics in the United States: A 
Brief Historical Survey, 19 Cambridge J. Econ. 331–52 (1995).  
107  See Introduction, in Feminism Confronts Homo Economicus, supra note 22, at xiii–xv. A small group 
of feminist legal theorists have critiqued law and economics along the same lines as feminist economists. 
See Gillian K. Hadfield, Feminism, Fairness, and Welfare: An Invitation to Feminist Law and Economics, 
1 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci. 285, 286 (“if adopting law and economics methodology means restricting one’s 
work to efficiency analysis and income redistribution, then the value of economics is substantially limited”); 
Barbara Ann White, Economic Efficiency, Economic Efficiency and the Parameters of Fairness: A Marriage of 
Marketplace Morals and the Ethic of Care, 15 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1, 11–12 (2005) [hereinafter White, 
Economic Efficiency] (discussing the tension between law and economics scholars and feminist scholars and 
proposing that both groups can learn from the other). For a robust critique of neoclassical economic theory 
from a feminist perspective, see Neil H. Buchanan, Playing with Fire: Feminist Legal Theorists and the Tools 
of Economics, in Feminism Confronts Homo Economicus, supra note 22, at 61–93.
108  Power, supra note 101, at 8. See also Paula England, Separative and Soluble Selves: Dichotomous 
Thinking in Economics, in Feminist Economics, supra note 101, at 33, 43 (summarizing principles of 
neoclassical economics); Drucilla K. Barker, Feminist Economics as a Theory and Method, in Handbook on 
Gender, supra note 56, at 18, 19–20 (same); Preface, in Feminist Economics, supra note 101, at vii (feminist 
economics is a response to “biases which give market relations pride of place over family and social relations, 
emphasize heroic individualism while ignoring interdependence, and define rationality so narrowly . . . leave 
the discipline impoverished”).
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“speaking truth to power,” neoclassical economics “accommodates and naturalizes it.”109 
By contrast, feminist economists stress the interdependence of social structures and human 
relationships.110 Expanding economic inquiry to this “more complex, holistic” view111 allows 
us to see how economic life both shapes and is influenced by gender norms.112 It focuses 
less on formal models, and more on how actual people live their lives.113 It recognizes that 
gender matters to economic outcomes, given that “women still bear a disproportionate bulk 
of the burdens of poverty [and] social and economic exclusion . . . .”114 
Feminist economists study a wide range of issues and apply a variety of approaches, 
and this summary necessarily simplifies much complex thought.115 There are at least four 
overarching methodological commitments within the field, each of which is tied to a critique 
or failure of mainstream economic thought.116 First, feminist economists include domestic 
and care work within the study of economic systems.117 Domestic and care work is central 
to women’s lives,118 yet traditional economics excludes care work from its analysis, as well 
as from standard measures of productivity, such as the Gross National Product.119 These 
109  Barker, supra note 108, at 25. 
110  Deborah M. Figart & Tonia L. Warnecke, Introduction, in Handbook on Gender, supra note 56, at 
1 (“the economy is embedded in society”); Barker, supra note 108, at 19 (“Feminist economists have been 
critical of the assumption of self-interested individualism and the lack of any interactions, except those 
organized according to the principles of self-interested contractual exchange, because these assumptions 
excluded considerations of the dependent children, the elderly, and the infirm.”). See also Barbara Ann White, 
Feminist Foundations for the Law of Business: One Law and Economics Scholar’s Survey and (Re)view, 10 
UCLA Women’s L.J. 39, 48 (1999) [hereinafter White, Feminist Foundations] (describing the centrality of the 
ethic of care to feminist thought in which “concern for others is of paramount importance”). 
111  Power, supra note 101, at 14.
112  Figart & Warnecke, supra note 110, at 1.
113  Barker, supra note 108, at 20.
114  Id. at 18.
115  See Power, supra note 101, at 11; Barker, supra note 108, at 23; Myra H. Strober, The Application of 
Mainstream Economics Constructs to Education: A Feminist Analysis, in Feminist Economics, supra note 
101, at 135, 137.
116  Power, supra note 101, at 11. 
117  Id. at 11; England & Folbre, Contracting for Care, in Feminist Economics, supra note 101, at 61, 63. 
118  Id. at 63.  
119  See Ann Laquer Estin, Can Families Be Efficient? A Feminist Appraisal, in Feminism Confronts Homo 
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exclusions serve to keep women “in their place.”120 Feminist economists contend that care 
work, usually unpaid or low-paid, has immense value for society, even as its workers are 
often degraded and devalued.121 In this vein, feminist economists recognize “understandings 
of motivation that do not fall under narrow or tautological notions of self-interest,”122 such 
as moral obligation and emotional connection.123 This mix of motivations makes caring 
labor valuable for society, but also depresses care work wages. Feminist economists also 
highlight that women’s wages suffer as a result of their care work obligations and that 
women continue to assume most household care responsibilities even if they work outside 
the home.124
Second, feminist economists maintain that economic success should be measured in 
terms of human well-being—or the “ability to lead a life one values”—and not simply 
by efficiency or profit-maximization norms.125 Moreover, even if transactions operate 
efficiently, outcomes can be unfair when the bargaining positions of actors are skewed 
Economicus, supra note 22, at 423, 424. Many feminist economists respond to the work of Nobel Prize 
winning economist Gary Becker, who theorized about families, namely that division of labor within families 
based on gender furthers utility and that male heads of household are altruistic, thereby coordinating family 
behavior. For a summary of Becker and his school of New Home Economics, see Philomena Tsoukala, Gary 
Becker, Legal Feminism, and the Costs of Moralizing Care, 16 Colum. J. Gender & L. 357 (2007) (arguing 
that feminists should use Becker’s theories to enhance feminist goals).
120  Marilyn Waring, If Women Counted: A New Feminist Economics 245 (1988). Waring’s 
groundbreaking work has led to new methods of accounting for women’s well-being and the benefits of 
household work. See Terje Langeland, Women Unaccounted for in Global Economy Proves Waring Influence, 
Bloomberg (June 18, 2003), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-06-18/women-unaccounted-
for-in-global-economy-proves-waring-influence [https://perma.cc/FQV8-DLD7]. There is a debate within 
feminism about the commodification of household labor. See generally Katharine B. Silbaugh, Commodification 
and Women’s Household Labor, in Feminism Confronts Homo Economicus, supra note 22, at 338–72. 
121  See infra Part IV.A.
122  Power, supra note 101, at 10. Legal scholar Barbara Ann White makes a similar reflection with regard 
to the law and economics movement, stating, “neoclassical law and economics views law as merely serving 
to facilitate the economic efficiency of the market and insists that an economy should be evaluated by its 
aggregated national wealth,” thus “ignoring any notice of the number of poor or the standard of living among 
the many.” White, Feminist Foundations, supra note 110, at 67.
123  England & Folbre, supra note 117, at 62–63.  
124  See Nelson, supra note 86, at 62, 64–66.
125  Power, supra note 101, at 12. 
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at the start. Thus, ethics should be part of economic analysis.126 This perspective shifts 
from a focus on efficiency to encompass a range of values, such as caring, quality of life, 
responsibilities to community, and economic justice.127 Nancy Folbre and Julie Nelson 
write that neoclassical economics is based on stereotypically male norms of autonomy 
and individual accomplishment, whereas women are traditionally associated with social 
and physical connection.128 As a result, “[n]eglecting the ‘connected’ aspects of human 
life . . . is a form of gender bias, in that aspects of human life traditionally associated with 
femininity are being irrationally downplayed.”129 
A third feminist economic principle is that human agency is essential to assessing 
economic events.130 Accordingly, “questions of power, and unequal access to power, are 
part of the analysis from the beginning.”131 In this analysis, the study of processes is just as 
important as the evaluation of outcomes.132 Feminist economists analyze power dynamics 
within the household, within the workplace, and within the public sphere.133 For instance, 
within the household, feminist economists have explored how people who remain outside 
the market are vulnerable to abuse by their more powerful partners, and also face potential 
economic catastrophe when a marriage dissolves.134 As to the marketplace, most economics 
texts view the sale of labor as an exchange benefitting both parties. “No mention is made 
of the fact that the employer has power over the employee, or of the particular power 
126  Id. at 13. See also White, Economic Efficiency, supra note 107, at 15–17 (describing the feminist ethic 
of care). White states that the ethic of care is “an alternative moral philosophy that is needs-based and guides 
community decisions according to differences among individuals.” Id. at 16.
127  Power, supra note 101, at 9. See also White, Feminist Foundations, supra note 110, at 66–67 (“the 
economic well-being of a society should be the distribution of income, and that a measure of an economically 
stable economy is one which maximizes the number of individuals who can earn a ‘decent wage’”). 
128  Nancy Folbre & Julie A. Nelson, For Love or Money—or Both?, 14 J. Econ. Persp. 123, 131 (2000).
129  Id. 
130  Power, supra note 101, at 12.
131  Id. at 12. Paula England discusses how people can be both autonomous and interconnected, contrary to 
assumed dichotomies within neoclassical economics. See England, supra note 108, at 35–40. 
132  Power, supra note 101, at 12.  
133  See e.g., Bina Agarwal, “Bargaining” and Gender Relations: Within and Beyond the Household, 3 
Feminist Econ. 1 (1997) (discussing bargaining models within families, the market, communities and the 
state).
134  See Geoff Schneider & Jean Shackelford, Economics Standards and Lists: Proposed Antidotes for 
Feminist Economics, 7 Feminist Econ. 77, 83 (2001) (citing the work of Barbara Bergmann). 
Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 2132.1
inequities in the exchange that reinforce the employer’s power.”135 Feminist analysis also 
provides a richer description of how businesses actually act, as opposed to how models 
predict they will act.136 With regard to the state, feminists note government’s potential 
to correct for market imperfections, but also to be captured by powerful interests and to 
reinforce gender inequality.
Fourth, (and here economists have borrowed from feminist legal theory and the 
foundational insights of Kimberlé Crenshaw137), economic analysis should include 
intersectional understandings of how class, race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and 
other identities interact.138 The intersection of these forms of oppression generates a specific 
life experience, and as a result, efforts to enhance equality must take into account these 
multiple dimensions.139 “Without a vision that is sensitive to the different but interactive 
effects of race and gender on economic outcomes, we would not see the differences in 
patterns of discrimination nor be impelled to ask how we might explain them.”140 This also 
means that feminist theorists need to be aware of their own privilege and to interrogate 
their own values and ideology.141
These principles provide a tool for assessing and reforming law, which of course, 
helps to shape the economy. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court opinions studied here are a 
depressing rejection of these feminist economic ideals. In the conservative Court majority’s 
135  Id.
136  Julie A. Nelson, Separative and Soluble Firms: Androcentric Bias and Business Ethics, in Feminist 
Economics, supra note 101, at 81, 96 (describing businesses as “entities that involve real, living people who 
form complex economic (and social) relationships”).  
137  Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Chi. L.F. 139 (1989); Kimberlé 
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 
Stan. L. Rev. 1241 (1991).  
138  Power, supra note 101, at 13. See also S. Charusheela, Intersectionality, in Handbook on Gender, 
supra note 56, at 32, 32–43.
139  Charusheela, supra note 138, at 32–33. 
140  Lisa Saunders & William Darity Jr., Feminist Theory and Racial Based Economic Inequality, in Feminist 
Economics, supra note 101, at 101, 109. An example of this sort of analysis is in Gary Dymski et al., Race, 
Gender, Power, and the US Subprime Mortgage and Foreclosure Crisis: A Meso Analysis, 19 Feminist Econ. 
124 (2013) (describing how banking strategies underlying the foreclosure crisis were shaped by and reinforced 
patterns of racial and gender inequality).
141  Barker, supra note 108, at 27.  
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law and economics viewpoint, government regulation hinders efficient outcomes generated 
by the market, “thus obviating the need for laws that redistribute rights and resources in 
an egalitarian manner.”142 Not surprisingly, the Court’s narrow view of the economy leads 
to results that are bleak for women workers.143 As explained below, the Court’s opinions 
devalue the contributions of care workers, elevate profits over the needs of workers, 
reinforce power structures that oppress women and limit their economic security, and apply 
harmful gender, race, and class stereotypes about women workers. The three decisions 
analyzed below are the Court’s leading, most recent opinions regarding women’s roles 
within the low-wage workforce. Collectively, they impact millions of women, including 
women who were not parties to the actual cases. In each case, the workers lost by a close 
5-4 decision. The analysis below does not focus on the substantive law implicated by the 
decisions, but rather, examines the underlying economic and gender assumptions of the 
majority and the dissents. 
II. Wal-Mart v. Dukes and Modern-Day Discrimination
A. The Economics of Discrimination
Over fifty years after Congress passed Title VII and outlawed employment discrimination 
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,144 such discrimination still exists. 
Evidence of discrimination arises from continued high rates of employment discrimination 
complaints,145 as well as studies by labor economists.146 For instance, blind audit studies 
142  See Introduction, in Feminism Confronts Homo Economicus, supra note 22, at xiv; Terence Dougherty, 
Economic Rhetoric, Economic Individualism, and the Law and Economics School, in Feminism Confronts 
Homo Economicus, supra note 22, at 3.  
143  These outcomes are consistent with a general pro-business tilt of the Roberts Court. See Lee Epstein, 
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 1431, 
1472 (2013) (stating that the “Roberts Court is much friendlier to business” than its preceding courts).
144  Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 7, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
145  See Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2015, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Commission, http://
eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm [https://perma.cc/3WGL-P4NT] (showing over 88,000 
discrimination claims filed in 2014). While success rates in litigation are low, this is not due to a lack of merit. 
See Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 
96 Minn. L. Rev. 1275, 1282–83, 1288 (2012). See also Michael Selmi, Sex Discrimination in the Nineties, 
Seventies Style: Case Studies in the Preservation of Male Workplace Norms, 9 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 1, 
4–24 (2005) [hereinafter Selmi, Sex Discrimination] (describing major class action employment discrimination 
lawsuits, most of which resulted in settlements).
146  See Selmi, Sex Discrimination, supra note 145, at 26–42 (summarizing results of empirical studies 
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have shown that female orchestra candidates are more likely to be selected if they audition 
behind a screen, where gender is invisible to selectors.147 Similarly, studies have shown that 
employers are 50% more likely to select resumes with racially identifiable white names over 
identical resumes with stereotypically Black names.148 Likewise, statistical studies reveal 
managerial preferences for employees who share the same race as the manager.149 The 
gender pay gap is yet another indication and result of discrimination.150 Studies establish 
that even after controlling for a variety of variables that contribute to the pay gap—such as 
personal preference, individual qualifications, occupation, and industry—a remaining gap 
is attributable to discrimination.151  
Discrimination has both individual and societal harms. It is unfair and dignity-
stripping to reward or punish workers on the basis of innate traits that are irrelevant to job 
performance. Discrimination can result in psychological injuries ranging from depression 
and their limitations); John J. Donohue III, The Law and Economics of Antidiscrimination Law 38–46 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11631, 2005), http://www.nber.org/papers/w11631.pdf [https://
perma.cc/WY7V-89ZA] (same).
147  Claudia Goldin & Ceclilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of ` Blind’ Auditions on Female 
Musicians, 90 Am. Econ. Rev. 715 (2000).
148  Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and 
Jamal?  A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 Am. Econ. Rev.  991–1013 (2004). See also 
Devah Pager, Race, Ethnicity, and Inequality in the U.S. Labor Market: Critical Issues in the New Millennium: 
The Use of Field Experiments for Studies of Employment Discrimination: Contributions, Critiques, and 
Directions for the Future, 609 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 104, 112 (2007) (“[e]ach study comes to 
the same basic conclusion—that race matters in hiring decisions”).
149  Laura Guliano, David I. Levine & Jonathan Leonard, Manager Race and the Race of New Hires, 27 
J. Lab. Econ. 1, 37 (2008), http://www.irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/150-07.pdf [https://perma.cc/95ZW-
MLGS].
150  See, e.g., Judy Goldberg Dey & Catherine Hill, Behind the Pay Gap 3 (2007), http://www.aauw.
org/files/2013/02/Behind-the-Pay-Gap.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6GK-H3MN]; Francine D. Blau & Lawrence 
M. Kahn, Gender Differences in Pay, 14 J. Econ. Persp. 75, 82 (2000).
151  See Cheryl Travis et al., Tracking the Gender Pay Gap: A Case Study, 33 Psychol. Women Q. 410, 
410–11 (2009) (citing studies); Gowri Ramachandran, Pay Transparency, 116 Pa. St. L. Rev. 1043, 1050–51 
(2012) (describing studies of the race and gender pay gap that controlled for multiple factors and concluded that 
discrimination was a factor). There is also a gender gap in management; women are 49% of the non-managerial 
workforce, but only 40% of managers. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Women in Management: 
Analysis of Female Managers’ Representation, Characteristics, and Pay 6 (2010), http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d10892r.pdf [https://perma.cc/NDU8-WX3Y].    
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to post-traumatic stress disorder.152 Moreover, discrimination results in under-utilization of 
human capital and skills.153 Not surprisingly, discrimination has economic consequences. 
Studies show that businesses with greater gender diversity, and that utilize equal pay and 
promotion practices have higher revenues, profitability, and market share due to greater 
employee loyalty and productivity.154 The converse is true as well. Moreover, four in ten 
mothers are primary breadwinners for their families. 155 Thus, wages that are depressed due 
to discrimination result in less income for families to spend on goods and services. Class 
actions are one effective means for combating discrimination. Class actions are important 
because they are not only efficient, but they also allow plaintiffs to uncover evidence of 
systemic practices and to aggregate low-value claims that they otherwise could not afford 
to bring.156 However, the Supreme Court limited the availability of this tool in Wal-Mart 
v. Dukes.
152  See Wizdom Powell Hammond, Marion Gillen & Irene H. Yen, Workplace Discrimination and 
Depressive Symptoms: A Study of Multi-Ethnic Hospital Employees, 2 Race & Soc. Probs. 19 (2010), http://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2867471/ [https://perma.cc/SKF4-LYLM] (“Exposure to workplace 
discrimination has . . . been found to harm mental health from diminished psychological well-being, increased 
risk of psychological distress, and pronounced depressive symptoms.”); Jane Goodman-Delahunty & 
William E. Foote, Evaluation for Workplace Discrimination and Harassment 81 (2010) (describing 
psychological impacts of discrimination).
153  Scott A. Moss, Women Choosing Diverse Workplaces: A Rational Preference with Disturbing 
Implications for Both Occupational Segregation and Economic Analysis of Law, 27 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 9 (2004) 
(“Not only does discrimination lower human capital, it also negatively influences the strategic choices of 
discriminated-against groups.”). See also id. at 13 (describing harms of discrimination).
154  See Nancy Levit, Megacases, Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of Workplace Reform, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 
367, 426 (2008).
155  See Catherine Rampell, U.S. Women on the Rise as Family Breadwinner, N.Y.Times, May 29, 2013, at 
B1 (reporting on results of a Pew Research Center analysis of Census and polling data).  
156  See Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 106 
Nw. U. L Rev. Colloquy 34, 36–37 (2011); Roger W. Reinsch & Sonia Goltz, You Can’t Get There From 
Here: Implications of the Walmart v. Dukes Decision for Addressing Second-Generation Discrimination, 9 Nw. 
J. L. & Soc. Pol’y 264, 267 (2014); Melissa Hart, The Possibility of Avoiding Discrimination: Considering 
Compliance and Liability, 39 Conn. L. Rev. 1623, 1634 (2007) (“These claims require for their success that 
workplace decisions be evaluated in the aggregate.”).
The Court has also limited the availability of class actions in other cases. In AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, Justice Scalia authored a 5-4 majority opinion that allows corporations and employers to use 
arbitration clauses to shield themselves from class actions. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 
333 (2011). On the impact of that case, see Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 
Impedes Access to Justice, 90 Or. L. Rev. 703 (2012).
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B. Background of the Case
In 2001, a proposed class of over 1.5 million current and past female employees filed 
a complaint against Wal-Mart alleging that Wal-Mart paid them less than men, despite 
women’s overall better performance and greater seniority, and provided women with fewer 
opportunities for promotion to management.157 Wal-Mart is the largest private employer in 
the United States, with approximately 3,400 stores and more than one million employees.158 
The plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart’s policy of giving its mostly male managerial workforce 
discretion over pay and promotion decisions allowed biases against women to infect the 
decision-making process in ways that disparately impacted women.159 Moreover, given 
that Wal-Mart was aware of the effect of its subjective discretion policy but did nothing to 
restrict it, women were subject to disparate treatment.160  
In their motion for class certification, the plaintiffs provided statistical data showing that 
women filled 65% of the hourly jobs at Wal-Mart, but constituted only 33% of management, 
with diminishing numbers farther up the ranks.161 In certifying the plaintiffs as a class, the 
district court found that there was sufficient evidence to suggest that this gender disparity 
resulted from Wal-Mart’s company-wide, subjective selection process, combined with its 
failure to post promotional opportunities.162 With regard to pay, the district court found 
“largely uncontested descriptive statistics” that women were paid less than men “in every 
region, that pay disparities exist in most job categories, [and] that the salary gap widens 
over time.”163 This disparity resulted within a “common feature of subjectivity” in setting 
pay across all stores.164
157  Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal 2004) 
(No. C-01-2252). The motion for class certification covered all women employed by Wal-Mart at any time 
since December 26, 1998. See id. at 141–42.
158  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011).  
159  Id. at 2548.  
160  Id. at 2548. Disparate treatment claims cover allegations that an employer treats some people differently 
on a prohibited basis; disparate impact involves employment practices that are facially neutral, but whose 
effects fall more harshly on a protected group. See Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: 
Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 91, 111 (2003).
161  Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 222 F.R.D. 137, 146 (N.D. Cal 2004).
162  Id. at 148–49.
163  Id. at 155.  
164  Id. at 148.
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 The plaintiffs also provided anecdotal evidence of gender bias through affidavits from 
121 class members.165 The district court cited comments by managers such as “[m]en are 
here to make a career and women aren’t. Retail is for housewives who just need to earn 
extra money,” and “[w]e need you in toys . . . you’re a girl, why do you want to be in 
Hardware.”166  
The district court further found that Wal-Mart’s uniform, centrally controlled corporate 
culture—called the Wal-Mart Way—may reinforce gender stereotypes through training 
programs, daily and weekly meetings in which company culture was discussed, promotions 
from within existing ranks, movement of store-level managers across stores and districts, and 
technological monitoring of all management decisions by the Home Office.167 The district 
court accepted the social framework testimony of the plaintiffs’ expert, who explained 
how managerial discretion over pay and promotions, exercised within Wal-Mart’s uniform 
corporate culture, fostered gender stereotyping, in which managers would “‘seek out and 
retain stereotyping-confirming information and ignore or minimize information that defies 
stereotypes.’”168 The Ninth Circuit, in a rehearing en banc, upheld the district court’s class 
certification decision.169 The Supreme Court subsequently reversed both lower courts.
C. The Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the 
commonality requirement for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23 because they could not show that Wal-Mart was motivated by the same reason for 
each employment outcome.170 Justice Scalia stated that there was no “common answer to 
the crucial question why was I disfavored.”’171 In the Court’s view, a policy of subjective 
discretion is not a uniform employment practice that provides the necessary commonality 
for class certification.172 Rather, subjective promotion and pay practices are a “very common 
165  Id. at 165.  
166  Id. at 165–66.  
167  Wal-Mart, 222 F.R.D. at 151–54.
168  Id. at 153–54 (quoting declaration of Dr. William Bielby).
169  Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 577 (9th Cir. 2010).  
170  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2554–56 (2011).
171  Id. at 2552.  
172  Id. at 2554.
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and presumptively reasonable way of doing business . . . .”173 Moreover, such subjective 
personnel practices could not constitute an official employer policy, because “[i]n a company 
of Wal-Mart’s size and geographical scope, it is quite unbelievable that all managers would 
exercise their discretion in a common way without some common direction.”174 Under 
the Court’s evidentiary standard for establishing commonality, employees must provide 
“significant proof” that their employer “operated under a general policy of discrimination . 
. . .”175 Subjective personnel policies apparently can no longer satisfy this new standard.176 
The opinion reflects many of the failings identified by feminist economists. The 
majority surfaced two economic assumptions about discrimination: first, discrimination 
is aberrant and arises only when a bad actor intentionally acts upon bias; and second, 
the market ensures that discrimination is too inefficient to be widespread. Both of these 
assumptions reflect dated thinking about how discrimination operates. In addition, the 
majority devalued the care work obligations of women. 
D. The Court’s Market Assumptions
Whereas the majority searched in vain for a corporate policy of discrimination, 
the dissent, authored by Justice Ginsburg (and joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan), applied a more nuanced understanding of discrimination.177 Justice Scalia 
expressed incredulity that supervisors would choose to discriminate, stating with no 
supporting evidence that “left to their own devices most managers in any corporation—and 
surely most managers in a corporation that forbids sex discrimination—would select sex-
neutral, performance-based criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable 
disparity at all.”178 
173  Id. at 2554.  
174  Id. at 2555.
175  Id. at 2553 (quoting General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159, n.15) (internal 
quotations omitted). The Court also rejected plaintiff’s statistical evidence, id. at 2555, and the testimony about 
social framework, id. at 2553–54.  
176  Michael J. Zimmer, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Taking the Protection Out of Protected Classes, 16 Lewis & 
Clark L. Rev. 409 (2012) (predicting that although the case was decided on procedural grounds, it portends 
changes in substantive Title VII law that will harm employees).  
177  Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.  
178  Id. at 2554.
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He is not alone: “Many individuals resist recognizing the existence of pervasively 
unfair group-based outcomes, as doing so would challenge the widely held and deep-seated 
belief that the world is just and that outcomes are based on personal control, meritocracies, 
and fairness.”179 The Court majority—and indeed the general public—remains wedded to 
the American myth of meritocracy, in which a free market rewards the deserving based on 
hard work and skill.180 This belief system has deep psychological roots that make people 
reluctant to attribute bad outcomes to discrimination.181 The meritocracy myth misses the 
huge impact of non-merit factors on individual success, such as inheritance (or the class 
position from which one starts out in life), educational opportunities, and discrimination.182 
Nevertheless, the myth and its economic underpinnings animate much of the majority’s 
viewpoints about discrimination. This viewpoint reinforces, rather than balances, existing 
power dynamics in favor of business owners.
By contrast, Justice Ginsburg did not ascribe to or require an “evil” motive on the part 
of employers to find discrimination.183 Rather, she understands that discrimination can be 
unintentional. As she stated, “The practice of delegating to supervisors large discretion 
to make personnel decisions, uncontrolled by formal standards, has long been known to 
have the potential to produce disparate effects. Managers, like all humankind, may be prey 
to biases of which they are unaware.”184 Justice Ginsburg was referring to the process of 
cognitive, or unconscious, bias. As she stated, “The risk of discrimination is heightened 
when . . . managers are predominantly of one sex, and are steeped in a corporate culture 
that perpetuates gender stereotypes.”185
179  Jonah Gelbach et al., Passive Discrimination: When Does It Make Sense to Pay Too Little?, 76 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 797, 841 (2009).  
180  Eyer, supra note 145, at 1304; Stephen J. & Robert K. Miller, Jr., The Meritocracy Myth 1–9 
(2d ed. 2009). See also Deborah Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 Tex. L. 
Rev. 1847, 1852–60 (1996) (describing competing theoretical models regarding the root causes of economic 
inequality—economic individualism versus a structural system of inequality).
181  Eyer, supra note 145, at 1299. This psychological phenomenon arises from the tension between 
American ideology about meritocracy and attributions of discriminatory conduct, which creates a “threat to 
many individuals’ core beliefs.” Id. at 1303, 1308.
182  Stephen J. McNamee & Robert K. Miller, The Meritocracy Myth 243–44 (2009).
183  Justice Ginsburg faced gender discrimination in her own professional life, which likely shaped her view 
of how it operates. See Carey Olney, Better Bitch Than Mouse: Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Feminism, and VMI, 9 
Buff. Women’s L.J. 97, 103–07 (2000–2001).
184  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2564 (2011).
185  Id. at 2564.
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 In the early years after Title VII was passed, employment discrimination was often 
blatant and motivated by racial and/or gender animus.186 While overt discrimination still 
exists,187 scholars now recognize “second generation” discrimination, which is more 
complex and subtle and fueled by unconscious bias.188 Psychologists have shown that 
unconscious bias arises from natural and normal cognitive shortcuts that all people use to 
simplify and process information.189 These cognitive shortcuts contribute to stereotypes, 
which in turn “cause discrimination by biasing how we process information about other 
people.”190 Although biases may operate without conscious intent to “favor or disfavor 
members of particular groups,” they can nevertheless “bias a decision maker’s judgment 
long before the ‘moment of decision’ [when the employment decision in question is made], 
as a decision maker attends to relevant data and interprets, encodes, stores, and retrieves it 
from memory.”191 In other words, employers expect members of certain groups to behave 
in certain ways, and they over-attribute information that confirms their expectations, while 
disregarding information that contradicts expectations.192 
Stereotyping is particularly likely to occur when evaluative criteria are subjective 
because biases can flourish without restraint.193 Indeed, extensive research establishes that 
186  See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 (1995); Susan Sturm, Second 
Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 459, 459–60 (2001); 
Green, supra note 160, at 91, 95–96; Audrey J. Lee, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination 
Litigation, 40 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 481, 482 (2005).
187  See Selmi, Sex Discrimination, supra note 145, at 4 (asserting that overt workplace discrimination still 
persists).
188  See Green supra note 160, at 96–99; Krieger, supra note 186, at 1186–88; Barbara F. Reskin, The 
Proximate Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29 Contemp. Soc. 319, 326 (2000) (noting that “I and others 
suspect that most employment discrimination originates in the cognitive processes . . . .” ); Sturm, supra note 
186, at 468–74. An emerging field of economics called behavioral economics studies how cognitive bias and 
other psychological phenomena impact decision-making in ways ignored by neoclassical economics. See The 
Behavioral Economics Guide 2015 (Alain Samson ed., 2015), http://www.behavioraleconomics.com/the-
behavioral-economics-guide-2015/ [https://perma.cc/HUQ8-7WZJ]. 
189  See Krieger, supra note 186, at 1187, 1199; Lee, supra note 186, at 482.
190  Krieger, supra note 186, at 1199.
191  Id. at 1187–88.
192  Id. at 1198. 
193  See Lee, supra note 186, at 484, 487–88; Tristin K. Green & Alexandra Kalev, Discrimination-Reducing 
Measures at the Relational Level, 59 Hastings L.J. 1435, 1444 (2008); Barbara F. Reskin & Debra B. McBrier, 
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subjective, discretionary personnel practices contribute to pay disparities.194 Despite these 
modern understandings of discrimination, Justice Scalia was wedded to old-fashioned 
notions that focus solely on an employer’s state of mind rather than on how unconscious 
bias interacts with organizational structures to allow unchecked stereotypes to determine 
employment outcomes.195 In so doing, he left undisturbed existing power relationships.
Justice Scalia’s statement that managers will normally render sex-neutral decisions rests 
on a belief that the market generally cures discrimination, which, when it happens, is the 
result of deviant outliers. In this law and economics viewpoint, discrimination is inefficient, 
and therefore, the market will punish and eliminate bad actors that discriminate.196 Law and 
economics scholars posit that competition for consumers and workers either has or will 
drive out discrimination, as will employers’ increasing experience with women workers and 
resulting knowledge about their abilities and performance.197 However, as Lesley Wexler 
has thoroughly explained in the context of the Wal-Mart case, there are many reasons why 
these neoclassical economic assumptions falter in the context of Wal-Mart. She explains 
how Wal-Mart can be ruthless in its pursuit of profits through low prices and high volume 
sales, yet still fail to implement nondiscriminatory pay and promotion practices.198 
Wexler highlights three key factors. First, workers have limited leverage at Wal-
Mart because Wal-Mart is not concerned about worker quality or exit costs, and because 
workers lack comparative information about pay.199 Second, Wal-Mart has limited market 
competition for workers; indeed, it is bigger than its next six competitors and thus drives 
Why Not Ascription? Organizations’ Employment of Male and Female Managers, 65 Am. Soc. Rev. 210, 214 
(2000). Scholars note that employers can take concrete measures to counteract stereotypes and bias. See Lee, 
supra note 186, at 486. In other words, cognitive bias is not insurmountable.
194  See Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes: Lessons for the Legal Quest for Equal 
Pay, 46 New Eng. L. Rev. 229, 256 (2012).  
195  As Professor Michael Selmi commented, “[t]he irony in the Court’s position should be apparent: it 
can see discrimination only in its most blatant forms but everything we know about discrimination suggests 
that contemporary discrimination looks very different.” Michael Selmi, The Evolution of Employment 
Discrimination Law: Changed Doctrine for Changed Social Conditions, 2014 Wis. L. Rev. 937, 992 (2014) 
[hereinafter Selmi, Evolution]. 
196  See generally Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment 
Discrimination Laws 34 (1992).
197  Lesley Wexler, Wal-Mart Matters, 46 Wake Forest L. Rev. 95, 112–13 (2011).
198  Id. at 99–101
199  Id. at 114–16.
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down market wages.200 Third, as for customers, they have little influence on Wal-Mart’s 
employment practices due to their lack of knowledge, indifference, or shared beliefs in 
the governing stereotypes.201 For all these reasons, Wexler concludes, “highly rational 
and efficient companies need not always sacrifice the bottom line in order to maintain a 
preference for discrimination.” 202 
Wal-Mart may have an official policy against discrimination (although it was actually 
late to the game, enacting a policy against harassment only in the mid-1990s),203 but the 
Court majority is either hopelessly naïve or purely disingenuous to conclude, as it did, 
that this policy determines Wal-Mart’s practices.204 All major employers have similar 
policies, as that is the state of the law. However, there is no evidence that official corporate 
statements prevent discrimination.205 Overall, the Court places its faith in the market to 
“cure” discrimination, and in so doing, it discounts other values, such as women’s desire to 
be treated fairly without the burdens of gender stereotyping.
E. Devaluation of Care Work
The majority also failed to recognize how many women at Wal-Mart fell victim to 
caregiver discrimination, also known as family responsibility discrimination.206 This 
stereotype holds that because women are—and should be—the primary caretakers for their 
children, they are less likely to prioritize work and to therefore succeed in the workplace.207 
200  Id. at 117.
201  Id. at 118–19.
202  Id. at 121.
203  Wexler, supra note 197, at 110–11.
204  See Selmi, Evolution, supra note 195, at 991. See also Moss, supra note 153, at 20–23 (noting that most 
employers have boilerplate anti-discrimination policies, which can be purely symbolic shams, but that courts 
nevertheless accept them as evidence of non-discrimination). 
205  See Moss, supra note 153, at 23 (“The worse discriminators therefore have the greatest incentive to 
adopt the best-sounding EEO polices.”).
206  See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are 
Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 Harv. Women’s L.J. 77, 90–94 (2003) (“designing workplaces around 
men’s traditional bodies and life patterns discriminates against women and male caregivers.”); Joan C. Williams 
& Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”: Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments 
in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59 Hastings L.J. 1311, 1313 (2008).
207  See Williams & Bornstein, supra note 206, at 1326.
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The record in the Wal-Mart case was laden with examples of statements reflecting this bias, 
such as a male manager who stated that “women should be home barefoot and pregnant”; a 
female employee who was told to resign and “find a husband to settle down with and have 
children”; and a supervisor who asked for the resignation of the only female store manager 
in her district because she “needed to be home raising [her] daughter” instead of managing 
a store.208 Justice Ginsburg acknowledged the pervasiveness of this stereotype, explaining 
that Wal-Mart’s policy of requiring relocation as a condition for promotions created a risk 
that “managers will act on the familiar assumption that women, because of their services 
to husband and children, are less mobile than men.”209 This could lead management to pass 
over women willing to move, or to enforce a policy that harms women who cannot relocate 
as members of dual-earner families, with no concomitant productivity benefit.210 Ginsburg 
sees that supposedly “natural” or “inevitable” market outcomes that disadvantage women 
are actually the result of stereotyped thinking put into action. She thus argues that society 
needs to support care work rather than punish women for their care obligations.
F. Impact
The immediate impact of the Wal-Mart decision was that the 1.5 million plaintiffs did 
not get the relief they were seeking. Instead, they had to go back to the drawing board to 
redesign their lawsuit, and they did so, filing a series of smaller class action complaints 
limited by geographical region, although there has been little success to date due to court 
denials of class certification and statute of limitations bars.211  
208  The National Women’s Law Center collected these examples, which were taken from the Joint Appendix 
submitted to the Supreme Court by the litigants in Wal-Mart v. Dukes. Wal-Mart v. Dukes—Why the Supreme 
Court Should Stand With Working Women, Nat’l Women’s L. Ctr. (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.nwlc.org/
resource/wal-mart-v-dukes-why-supreme-court-should-stand-working-women [https://perma.cc/HP23-
VUUW].
209  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2563 (2011). 
210  See Wexler, supra note 197, at 109–10; Naomi Schoenbaum, The Family and the Market at Wal-Mart, 62 
DePaul L. Rev. 759, 765–66 (2013). The record showed that there were other stereotypes at play at Wal-Mart 
as well, including the stereotype that women are not their families’ primary breadwinners and that therefore, 
higher-paying positions should go to men, and the assumption that men and women prefer and are better at 
gender-defined roles. See Brief Amici Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and National Women’s 
Law Center, et al., In Support of Respondents, at 16–24, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Dukes (2011) (No. 10-277), 
2011 WL 805231.  
211  See Scott Flaherty, 3 Years After Dukes, Employees Struggle in Wal-Mart Cases, Law 360 (July 17, 
2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/558047/3-years-after-dukes-employees-struggle-in-wal-mart-cases 
[https://perma.cc/RJ9W-6KJN].
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One investigative study found that in the aftermath of the decision, “[j]ury verdicts 
have been overturned, settlements thrown out, and class actions rejected or decertified, 
in many instances undoing years of litigation. The rulings have come in every part of 
the country, in lawsuits involving all types of companies.”212 The study found that fewer 
employment discrimination class action cases are being filed, and settlement amounts have 
plummeted from $346 million for the biggest ten cases in 2010 to $45 million in 2012.213 
In short, Wal-Mart v. Dukes has tipped the litigation balance strongly in favor of employers 
over employees.214 The case has clearly impacted the availability of large class actions 
challenging employment practices. 
The case has also left employment discrimination law in flux, particularly as applied to 
second generation claims challenging subjective employment practices.215 These forms of 
discrimination operate “less as a blanket policy or discrete, identifiable decision to exclude 
than as a perpetual tug on opportunity and advancement.”216 The majority’s ruling means 
that discretionary employment practices cannot provide the basis for a common claim in 
a class action lawsuit.217 The result may be an increase of gender-based pay disparities 
in the workplace, due to the Court’s presumption that subjective personnel practices are 
reasonable.218 In fact, employers may now have a perverse incentive to maintain subjective 
practices without centralized oversight as a way of evading Title VII liability. And, given 
Wal-Mart’s dominant status in the marketplace, other employers may be encouraged to 
212  Nina Martin, The Impact and Echoes of the Wal-Mart Discrimination Case, ProPublica (Sept. 27, 
2013), http://www.propublica.org/article/the-impact-and-echoes-of-the-wal-mart-discrimination-case [https://
perma.cc/7QS7-96FM].
213  Id.
214  See Malveaux, supra note 156, at 35, 52; Katherine E. Lamm, Work on Progress: Civil 
Rights Class Actions After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 50 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 153 (2015) (surveying 
impact of the case on future class actions and making recommendations to litigators). Cf. Elizabeth 
Tippett, Robbing A Barren Vault: The Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart for Cases Challenging Subjective 
Employment Practices, 29 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 433 (2012) (arguing that the case’s effect will be less 
dramatic than some predict).
215  See Zimmer, supra note 176, at 460; Eisenberg, supra note 194, at 157; Malveaux, supra note 156, at 
44; Selmi, Evolution, supra note 195, at 941.
216  Melissa Hart, Learning From Wal-Mart, 10 Emp. Rts. & Emp. Pol’y J. 355, 376 (2006).
217  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2553, 2556 (2011).
218  Eisenberg, supra note 194, at 257.
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follow their model.219 For all these reasons, scholars have been looking for other Title VII 
theories, alternate employment statutes, and other statutory models to frame claims, as 
well as non-litigation alternatives, such as structural reform of workplace practices and 
employer compliance programs.220   
III. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
A. The Economics of Contraception
Decades of research establish that contraception access directly fosters women’s 
economic well-being by helping women control the size of their families and the timing of 
childrearing.221 In turn, this control allows women to make educational and employment 
decisions that benefit themselves and the broader society.222 The Supreme Court has 
previously acknowledged the importance of reproductive autonomy, stating in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, “the ability of women to participate 
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to 
control their reproductive lives.”223 
219  Id. 
220  See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 194, at 262–70 (advocating for bringing discrimination claims under the 
Equal Pay Act); Tristin K. Green, Civil Rights Lemonade: Title VII, Gender, and Working Options for Working 
Families, 10 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 191, 213–15 (2014) (advocating for the need to expand working options for 
families); Melissa Hart, The Possibility of Avoiding Discrimination: Considering Compliance and Liability, 39 
Conn. L. Rev. 1623, 1635–44 (2007) (advocating for employer-based compliance practices); Reinsch & Goltz, 
supra note 156, at 289–300 (advocating for a fraud on the market approach taken from securities cases); Sturm, 
supra note 186, at 522–37 (advocating for a regulatory approach involving multiple intermediaries).
221  Adam Sonfield et al., The Social and Economic Benefits of Women’s Ability to Determine Whether and 
When to Have Children, Guttmacher Inst. 3 (Mar. 2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/social-economic-
benefits.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9YZ-CUJ4] [hereinafter Sonfield et al., Social and Economic Benefits]. Indeed, 
in a major survey, 77% of women who used birth control reported that it allowed them to better care for 
themselves and their families, while large majorities also reported that birth control allowed them to support 
themselves financially (71%), stay in school (64%), and help them obtain and maintain employment (64%). 
See Colleen Connell, Lorie Chaiten, & Richard Muniz, Religious Refusals Under the Affordable Care Act: 
Contraception as Essential Health Care, 15 DePaul J. Health Care L. 1, 5 (2013).
222  Connell, et al., supra note 221, at 5.
223  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992). Unfortunately, Casey has failed to 
protect women’s reproductive choices because the courts have given little teeth to the undue burden standard. 
See Linda J. Wharton & Kathryn Kolbert, Preserving Roe v. Wade . . . When You Win Only Half the Loaf, 24 
Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 143, 144–45, 156 (2013). As a result, states have enacted many abortion restrictions, 
such as waiting periods and onerous licensing regimes, which in turn put abortion out of reach for many 
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Notably, since the Supreme Court established contraception as a fundamental right 
in 1965, the percentage of women participating in the workforce has more than doubled 
to around 60% of women.224 Moreover, access to contraception has contributed to 
approximately one-third of women’s wage gains since the mid-twentieth century.225 The 
advent of available birth control has also lead to dramatic increases in the numbers of 
women in college and in formerly male-dominated professions such as medicine, dentistry, 
law, and business.226 Contraception also supports women’s health and that of their children. 
It can limit the health risks involved in pregnancy,227 which are compounded for unintended 
or narrowly-spaced pregnancies.228  
For all these reasons, over 99% of sexually active American women between fifteen 
and forty-four have used birth control.229 Nevertheless, about half of all annual pregnancies 
are unintended, amounting to 2.8 million births, and of these, about half result from the 
14% of women using no form of contraception.230 One contributing factor to unintended 
women. Id. at 157–58. As this Article was going to press, the Supreme Court struck down Texas abortion 
regulations requiring that abortion facilities meet the standards for ambulatory surgical centers and that doctors 
performing abortions have admitting privileges at nearby hospitals; these requirements dramatically reduced 
the availability of abortion services in Texas. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 579 U.S. __ (2016). The 
ruling was 5-3 (Justice Scalia’s seat remains open as of the date of the decision). This decision—along with 
its future application to numerous similar regulations around the country—will improve the economic security 
of millions of women given the links between reproductive health access and economic stability. See Michele 
Gilman, How Limiting Women’s Access to Birth Control and Abortions Hurts the Economy, Huffington Post 
(Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/the-conversation-us/how-limiting-womens-acces_b_9796032.
html [https://perma.cc/6WC8-FSXT].
224  Connell et al., supra note 221, at 6.
225  Id.; see Sonfield et al., Social and Economic Benefits, supra note 221, at 14.
226  Connell et al., supra note 221, at 5–6; Sonfield, et al., Social and Economic Benefits, supra note 221, at 
7–8, 11. 
227  Connell et al., supra note 221, at 1 (“out of every 100,000 births in the United States, 12.7 women die 
as a result of pregnancy-related complications”).
228  Id. at 4. In addition, “women experiencing unintended pregnancy are at increased risk for depression, 
anxiety, and other mental health conditions. Furthermore, unintended pregnancy increases a woman’s risk of 
experiencing domestic violence and marital strain.” Id. at 5.  
229  Kimberly Daniels, Williams Mosher & Jo Jones, Contraceptive Methods Women Have Ever Used: 
United States, 1982–2010, 62 Nat’l Health Stat. Rep. (2013), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr062.
pdf [https://perma.cc/NLX9-XJX7].
230  Fact Sheet: Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, Guttmacher Inst. (May 2016), https://www.
guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/factsheet/fb-unintended-pregnancy-us_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/62RR-YU22].
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pregnancy is the cost of birth control, particularly for the most effective, long-lasting 
forms.231 For instance, the cost of an IUD equals a month’s full-time pay for a minimum 
wage worker.232 Thus, it turns out that only one-fourth of women who request an IUD go 
through with insertion after they find out the cost, which can exceed $1,000 for the device 
and medical procedure. Overall, almost one-third of women report that they would change 
their contraceptive method if cost were not a factor.233 These costs are significant, given 
that the average American woman wants two children, and thus she will need contraception 
for at least three decades of her life.234 The cost barrier is compounded for low-income 
women, who have five times the unintended pregnancy rate of women with incomes above 
200% the poverty line.235 Unfortunately, publicly funded family planning meets only 54% 
of the need.236 Not surprisingly, health insurance makes a difference, and women with 
coverage are much more likely to use contraceptive care.237
B. Background of the Case
The myriad of health and economic benefits associated with contraceptive access 
231  Gina M. Secura et al., The Contraceptive CHOICE Project: Reducing Barriers to Long-Acting 
Reversible Contraception, 203 Am. J. Obstetrics & Gynecology 115 (2010), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC2910826/ [https://perma.cc/BM8J-TBCL]. “Reasons for lack of use [of long-acting forms 
of contraception] include women’s knowledge of and attitudes towards the methods, practice patterns among 
providers, and high initial up-front cost associated with these methods.” Id. at 116.
232  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2800 n.22 (2014). See also David Eisenberg, 
Colleen McNicholas & Jeffrey F. Peipert, Cost as a Barrier to Long-Acting Reversible Contraceptive (LARC) 
Use in Adolescents, 52 J. Adolescent Health S59, S60 (2013), http://www.jahonline.org/article/S1054-
139X(13)00054-2/fulltext [https://perma.cc/Q6WZ-42CV] (“The total bill for a patient to initiate a LARC 
method generally exceeds $1000.”).
233  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2800 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (summarizing research); Su-Ying Liang et 
al., Women’s Out-of-Pocket Expenditures and Dispensing Patterns for Oral Contraceptive Pills Between 1996 
and 2006, 83 Contraception 528, 531 (2011).
234  Guttmacher Inst., Fulfilling the Promise: Public Policy and U.S. Family Planning Clinics 10 
(2000), https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fulfill.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6SN-HKN2]. 
235  Sonfield et al., Social and Economic Benefits, supra note 221, at 4; Kara Loewentheil, When Free 
Exercise Is a Burden: Protecting “Third Parties” in Religious Accommodation Law, 62 Drake L. Rev. 433, 
441 (2014). 
236  Sonfield et al., Social and Economic Benefits, supra note 221, at 30.
237  See Adam Sonfield, Contraception: An Integral Component of Preventative Care for Women, 
Guttmacher Pol’y Rev. 6–7 (Spring 2010), https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/13/2/gpr130202.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/E9JF-9K38].
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explain why the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) covers birth control. Under the ACA, 
employers with fifty or more full-time employees must offer “a group health plan or group 
health insurance coverage” that provides “minimum essential coverage.”238 Initial drafts of 
the ACA did not cover women’s preventive services, prompting Senator Barbara Mikulski 
to introduce the Women’s Health Amendment in order to counter gender discrimination 
in the health insurance market and “to guarantee women access to preventive health 
care screenings and care at no cost.”239 The Amendment passed, and is part of the ACA. 
Meanwhile (and relevant to the Hobby Lobby case), Congress defeated a proposed 
“conscience amendment” that would have allowed employers to deny certain forms of 
coverage based on religious beliefs.240 
Pursuant to the ACA, employer group health plans must provide “preventive care 
and screenings” for women,241 defined as the “full range” of FDA-approved contraceptive 
methods, as well as patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive 
capacity.242 By prohibiting patient cost sharing, the ACA “brought with it the potential to 
eliminate cost as a reason for choosing one method of contraception over another, a change 
238  26 U.S.C. 5000A(f)(2) (2010); 4980H(a), (c)(2) (2010).
239  Press Release, Senator Barbara A. Mikulski, Mikulski Puts Women First in Health Care Reform Debate 
(Nov. 30, 2009), http://www.lb7.uscourts.gov/documents/12-384119.pdf [https://perma.cc/5UWE-XM4X] 
[hereinafter Mikulski Press Release]. As she explained, “[w]omen are often confronted by the punitive 
practices of insurance companies. We face gender discrimination. We pay more and get less . . . . ” Id. On the 
legislative history of the contraceptive requirements of the ACA, see generally Rose Shingledecker, Note, No 
Good Deed: The Impropriety of the Religious Accommodation of Contraceptive Coverage Requirements in the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 47 Ind. L. Rev. 301, 301–04 (2014).
240  See, e.g., N.C. Aizenman & Rosalind S. Helderman, Birth Control Exemption Bill, the ‘Blunt amendment,’ 
Killed in Senate, Wash. Post (Mar. 1, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/birth-
control-exemption-bill-the-blunt-amendment-killed-in-senate/2012/03/01/gIQA4tXjkR_ story.html [https://
perma.cc/GB4M-NA97].
241  42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(4) (2010). The ACA directs that HFRA define “preventive care and screenings.” 
Id. HRFA is a unit of HHS.
242  HHS adopted the recommendation of the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”), an independent non-profit 
group of medical experts created by Congress in 1980 to advise the government on medical issues. See Burwell 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2762 (2014) (describing the legislative history). Inst. of Med., 
Clinical Preventive Services for Women: Closing the Gaps 103–04 (2011). The guidelines are at 77 Fed. 
Reg. 8725–26 (Feb. 10, 2012). Under these guidelines, employers must provide coverage without cost sharing 
for “all Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient 
education and counseling.” These guidelines include well-woman visits, screening for gestational diabetes, 
breastfeeding support and counseling, and screening and counseling for interpersonal and domestic violence. 
77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 10, 2012) (internal brackets omitted). 
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that could be particularly important for low-income women and women considering 
methods with substantial upfront costs.”243
C. The Majority Opinion
Almost immediately after passage of the ACA, litigation over the contraceptive 
mandate began.244 Over one hundred lawsuits were filed to challenge the contraceptive 
coverage requirement, and suits by three for-profit, closely-held corporations eventually 
reached the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on the 
issue.245 These plaintiffs contended (incorrectly) that certain forms of contraception, such 
as IUDs and emergency contraception, act as abortifacients,246 and thus complying with 
the contraception requirement would force them to facilitate abortions in violation of their 
religious beliefs. In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff corporations 
and ruled that the contraception mandate violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
of 1993 (“RFRA”)247 because it substantially burdens the exercise of religion and is not 
the least restrictive means for the government to achieve its objective.248 Hobby Lobby is 
the first case in which the “Court recognized a for-profit corporation’s qualification for a 
religious exemption from a generally applicable law . . . .”249 
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Alito and joined by Justices Roberts, Scalia, 
Thomas, and Kennedy (in concurrence) reasoned that corporations were “persons” who 
243  Adam Sonfield et al., Impact of the Federal Contraceptive Coverage Guarantee on Out-of-Pocket 
Payments for Contraceptives: 2014 Update, 91 Contraception 44, 44 (2014), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC4712914/ [https://perma.cc/DUP5-D4HN] [hereinafter Sonfield et al., Impact].
244  See Loewenthiel, supra note 235, at 449.  
245  See id.
246  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. For an explanation of why contraceptives are not abortifacients, 
see Priscilla J. Smith, Contraceptive Comstockery: Reasoning from Immorality to Illness in the Twenty-First 
Century, 47 Conn. L. Rev. 971, 1012–17 (2015).
247  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)-(b) (1993).
248  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759. RFRA states: “The Government shall not substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.” 42 USC. § 2000bb-
1(a). A governmental burden is allowed only if it “(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; 
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” Id. at 42 U.S.C. § 
2000bb-1(b).  
249  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2794 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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can engage in the “exercise of religion.”250 The Court concluded that the contraception 
mandate substantially burdened the plaintiffs’ religious belief that life begins at conception 
by forcing them to either violate their religious beliefs or to face large statutory penalties if 
they refused to cover contraception or dropped their group health plans altogether.251 The 
Court assumed for the purposes of argument that the government had a compelling interest 
in enacting the mandate,252 but held that these governmental interests could be served with 
a less restrictive alternative; that is, the government could cover the contraception itself 
or it could adopt the same accommodation it extends to religious non-profits by requiring 
insurance carriers to provide this coverage separately.253 As to the latter option, however, 
the Court conceded that it might not comply with RFRA “for purposes of all religious 
claims.”254 
D. The Court’s Market Assumptions
The case obviously presents sharp divisions among the Justices about the scope of 
RFRA and its protections for religious beliefs. The case also reveals major differences 
underlying the Justices’ assumptions about the market and its relationship to gender 
equality. The Hobby Lobby majority reinforced the primacy of corporations over the 
interests of employees and the general public. In so doing, the majority overturned a 
legislative solution intended to correct for a market imperfection that resulted from sex 
discrimination, i.e., a lack of accessible preventive care for all female employees. The 
majority opinion repeatedly emphasized the importance of the “the religious liberty of 
the humans who own and control those companies.”255 Justice Alito spun detailed and 
heartwarming origin stories of the plaintiffs Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood Specialties, 
as family-run companies founded by men and run today mostly by their sons.256 Women 
250  Id. at 2768–70.  
251  Id. at 2775–76. 
252  Id. at 2780.
253  Id. at 2781–82. Religious non-profit organizations that oppose providing contraception coverage can opt 
out through a certification process, and their employees’ health insurance company must provide coverage at 
its own cost. 45 § C.F.R. 147.131 (2015). 
254  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct at 2782.
255  Id. at 2768.
256  Id. at 2764 (Conestoga Wood Specialties was founded by Norman Hahn and one of his sons is the 
president and CEO); Id. at 2765 (David Green founded Hobby Lobby and one of his sons started an affiliated 
business).  
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were mentioned only as co-owners of the companies via their status as wives and mothers, 
with no corporate responsibilities.257 The elaborate description of the plaintiff corporations 
is entirely male-oriented and once again reinforces the primacy and power of business 
interests over that of workers.
Indeed, the Court paid scant attention to the interests of the anonymous female 
employees. Hobby Lobby has 13,000 employees, many of which are women and many 
of whom have female dependents. As Justice Ginsburg stated in her dissent, which was 
joined by Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Breyer, the majority’s decision denies “legions 
of women who do not hold their employers’ beliefs access to contraceptive coverage that 
the ACA would otherwise secure.”258 In her view, the autonomous health care decisions 
of women, made in consultation with their doctors, outweigh the beliefs of a handful of 
corporate owners.259 At the end of the day, “[w]orking for Hobby Lobby or Conestoga . 
. . should not deprive employees of the preventive care available to workers at the shop 
next door, at least in the absence of directions from the Legislature or Administration to 
do so.”260 Moreover, Justice Ginsburg explained that the burden on the corporations in 
complying with the ACA is minimal, especially since for-profit corporations do not have to 
buy or provide contraceptives, but rather, “to direct money into undifferentiated funds that 
finance a wide variety of benefits under comprehensive health plans.”261 
Not only did the majority provide uplifting descriptions of the plaintiff corporations, 
but it also waxed rhapsodic about the virtues of for-profit corporations. Corporations often 
“support a wide variety of charitable causes . . . [and] further humanitarian and other 
altruistic objectives.”262 Some corporations may even “take costly pollution-control and 
energy-conservation measures that go beyond what the law requires . . . [and] may exceed 
the requirements of local law regarding working conditions and benefits.” Yet while many 
corporations act admirably, other corporations damage the environment, discriminate 
257  In fact, the Greens have a daughter who serves a vice president of art and creative, although she is not 
named or identified as such in the Court opinion. See Brief for Respondents at 8, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13–354).
258  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2790. See also id. at 2787 (pointing to the interests of the “thousands of 
women employed by Hobby Lobby and Conestoga or dependents of persons those corporations employ”).
259  Id. at 2799.
260  Id. at 2804.
261  Id. at 2799.
262  Id. at 2771.
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against workers, lie about the safety of their products, engage in illegal monopolies, and 
so forth. The majority’s rosy and optimistic view of corporations is consistent with its 
expansion of corporate personhood into new domains.263 
By comparison, the majority was clearly not impressed with the government’s 
espoused interests in “public health” and “gender equality,” which it dismissed as “very 
broad.”264 The majority simply did not deem contraception as essential to women’s 
economic equality, evidently assuming that unhappy Hobby Lobby employees can leave 
and get other jobs with better benefits. In other words, the market should cure this ill. 
The Court’s dismissive attitude towards women’s reproductive health is exactly why the 
ACA covers contraception. The ACA remedies a gap in our public health and insurance 
system, which has long been designed around the needs of the male norm, while using 
women’s reproductive differences as a basis for discrimination.265 Prior to the ACA, there 
were numerous health plans that covered Viagra, a drug to help men enjoy their sex lives, 
while denying women contraception, a method essential for women to not only have 
healthy sexual lives, but also to make decisions about childrearing.266 Equality means more 
than “rooting out discriminatory treatment of similarly situated women and men”; it must 
“assure that implicitly male norms of the reproductive role are not unreflectively accepted 
as the measure of equality, thereby disadvantaging most women.”267 The Hobby Lobby 
majority has a robust view of equality for corporations, but none for women. Denying 
women access to contraception tells women that their concerns and need for control over 
their own destinies and economic well-being do not matter and that they are second-class 
citizens.268
Justice Ginsburg rejected the majority’s characterization of the government’s interests, 
263  See generally Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 4 Utah L. Rev. 1629 (2011); 
Anne Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free Speech and Corporate Personhood in 
Citizens United, 61 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 497 (2010).
264  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2799.
265  Cornelia T. Pillard, Our Other Reproductive Choices: Equality in Sex Education, Contraceptive Access, 
and Work-Family Policy, 56 Emory L.J. 941, 964 (2007).
266  Id. at 967.
267  Id. at 977.
268  Id. at 976. See also Douglas Nejaime & Reva Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience 
Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 Yale L.J. 2516, 2574–78 (2015) (describing the dignity harms from 
complicity-based conscience claims).
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discussing at length the rationale underlying the ACA’s preventive services coverage for 
women, and citing to extensive data, research, and expert recommendations. She argued 
that the government’s interests were “concrete, specific, and demonstrated by a wealth of 
empirical evidence,” regarding the health benefits of contraception in avoiding unintended 
pregnancies, reducing the risks to those for whom pregnancy can be dangerous, and treating 
non-pregnancy related health conditions.269 Notably, the only data wielded by the majority 
related to the amount of fines facing corporations who refuse to provide ACA coverage, 
which it deemed substantial. While the majority focused on fines, Justice Ginsburg noted 
that the corporation’s proposed alternative—a tax credit for employees—does “nothing 
for the woman too poor to be aided by a tax credit.”270 In so doing, she highlighted her 
awareness of the class differences among women and their differential access to health 
care. She further noted that the decision has no limiting principle: “Suppose an employer’s 
sincerely held religious belief is offended by health coverage of vaccines, or paying the 
minimum wage, or according women equal pay for substantially similar work?”271
In sum, the majority imbued corporations with personhood and painted them as 
beneficent actors while rejecting any legislative interference in corporate decision-making. 
As for gender, the majority reinforced historical patterns of gender inequality based on 
male norms of health needs. By contrast, the dissent, written by Justice Ginsburg, viewed 
the market as imperfect, and the legislative fix in the ACA as essential to meet the health 
and economic needs of women. 
E. Impact
For the millions of women outside the scope of the Hobby Lobby ruling, the contraceptive 
coverage guaranteed in the ACA is making a substantial and beneficial impact by eliminating 
out-of-pocket costs. For instance, between fall 2012 and spring 2014, one study showed 
that the proportion of users of the pill (oral contraception) who were paying zero dollars 
out of pocket increased from 15% to 67%, with similar increases for women using long-
term forms of contraception.272 Another study showed that women saved approximately 
$1.4 billion on birth control pills as a result of the ACA.273 Yet due to Hobby Lobby, there 
269  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2799.
270  Id. at 2803.
271  Id. (internal quotations omitted).
272  Sonfield, et al., Impact, supra note 243, at 46–47.
273  Affordable Care Act Results in Dramatic Drop In Out-Of-Pocket Prices for Prescription, Contraceptives 
Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 4332.1
is a large cadre of women employed by closely-held corporations whose access is more 
limited. In July 2015, HHS issued a rule allowing closely-held corporations (as defined 
by federal tax law) to seek a religious accommodation that exempts them from providing 
contraceptive coverage and transfers that obligation to insurance companies. It is likely 
that some closely-held corporations will object to the accommodation, as have numerous 
religious non-profits, claiming that even filing the necessary paperwork infringes on 
their religious rights.274 Even with the accommodation for religious non-profits, there is a 
“complete dearth of information” as to whether or not insurance plans are providing this 
coverage for employees.275 In addition, a different presidential administration may rescind 
the executive branch accommodation and thereby deny women certain forms of 
contraceptive coverage.276 
IV. Harris v. Quinn
A. The Economics of Caregiving
Everyone needs care at some point in life, whether during childhood, in coping with a 
disability, as a frail senior citizen, or some combination of these life phases.277 Simply put, 
Penn Medicine Study Finds, Penn Med. (July 7, 2015), http://www.uphs.upenn.edu/news/News_
Releases/2015/07/becker/ [https://perma.cc/KXR9-H2AE].
274  In Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1560 (2016), the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the issue 
to the courts of appeals, ruling that the “parties on remand should be afforded an opportunity to arrive at an 
approach going forward that accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that 
women covered by petitioners’ health plans ‘receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive 
coverage.’” 
275  Sonfield et al., Impact, supra note 243, at 47. Separate from the religious accommodation issue, there 
are still insurers who are not providing the legally required contraceptive services required by the ACA. See 
Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr., State of Women’s Coverage: Health Plan Violations of the Affordable 
Care Act (2015), http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/stateofcoverage2015final.pdf [https://perma.cc/
X6GN-GQPN].
276  Another contraceptive coverage gap exists due to the Court’s decision in Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus’s. 
v. Sebelius, in which the Court overturned a provision of the ACA requiring states to expand their Medicaid 
programs to cover Americans with income up to 138% of the federal poverty level. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus’s. 
v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012); 42 U.S.C.§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2015). States that chose not 
expanding Medicaid are leaving millions of low-income women without affordable insurance. Sonfield et al., 
Impact, supra note 243.
277  Nancy Folbre & Erik Olin Wright, Defining Care, in For Love and Money: Care Provision in the 
United States [hereinafter For Love and Money] 1, 10 (Nancy Folbre ed., 2012).
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everyone is vulnerable and faces times of dependency.278 Despite the importance of their 
task, domestic workers generally toil long hours for little pay and few, if any, benefits, and 
suffer social isolation and high rates of physical injuries.279 Nevertheless, due in part to the 
growth of Medicaid and Medicare, along with a growing senior population,280 care work is 
one of the fastest growing occupations in America, as it “cannot be offshored.”281 According 
to the Department of Labor, there are two million workers providing home care to the 
elderly and the disabled, such as personal care aides, certified nursing assistants, and 
home health aides.282 Ninetey percent of domestic workers are women, while one-third are 
African-American; one-fifth are Hispanic; and one-fifth are immigrants.283 Eighty percent 
live below the poverty line.284 
Domestic worker union organizing has been effective in improving pay and work 
conditions for care workers.285 It is also a rare bright spot in the overall decline of unions. 
Unionization campaigns for domestic workers began in the 1970s and 1980s with “roots 
in the welfare rights movement and the dynamic growth in hospital and health care 
278  Eileen Boris & Jennifer Klein, Caring for America: Home Health Care Workers in the Shadow 
of the Welfare State 17 (2012); Martha Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human 
Condition, 20 Yale J.L. & Feminism, 1, 8–9 (2008).
279  Candace Howes, Carrie Leana, & Kristin Smith, Paid Care Work, in For Love and Money, supra 
note 277, at 65, 83–86, 180. They earn less money than workers with similar characteristics in other fields. Id. 
at 71–72. See also Janie Chuang, Achieving Accountability for Migrant Domestic Worker Abuse, 88 N.C. L. 
Rev. 1627, 1632 (“[D]omestic workers in general remain among the most exploited and abused workers in the 
world.”).  
280  Folbre & Wright, supra note 277, at 10; Nancy Folbre, Valuing Care, in For Love and Money, supra 
note 277, at 92; Howes et al., supra note 279, at 70.
281  Boris & Klein, supra note 278, at 6. Domestic work encompasses a variety of occupations, including 
child care workers and adult care workers. See Howes et al., supra note 279, at 67–69.
282  Minimum Wage, Overtime Protections Extended to Direct Care Workers by US Labor Department, U.S. 
Dep’t Lab. (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/whd/WHD20131922.htm [https://perma.cc/
E6QE-G7GV].
283  Sheila Bapat, Part of the Family? Nannies, Housekeepers, Caregivers and the Battle for 
Domestic Workers’ Rights 129 (2014); Folbre & Wright, supra note 277, at 7.
284  Howes et al., supra note 279, at 74.
285  In general, unionization raises women’s pay by 12.9%. John Schmitt & Nicole Woo, Ctr. for 
Econ. & Policy Research, Women Workers and Unions, 2 (2013), http://www.cepr.net/documents/union-
women-2013-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/8896-89FL].
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unionism.”286 Moreover, because care workers are in a relationship with both the state and 
individual consumers, unions mobilized on multiple fronts, from organizing clients and 
communities, to pressuring state governments, to connecting with other service workers.287 
Victories included California’s 1992 adoption of a law that created a legal employment 
relationship between home care workers and the state for collective bargaining purposes.288 
California’s law led to both reductions in the poverty rate and lower turnover for home care 
workers in California.289 Other states have also codified collective bargaining rights for 
publicly paid home care workers.290 These successes were due to “coalition politics [that] 
opened up a space for the self-activity and politicization of tens of thousands of low-wage 
women.”291  
Today, the rate of unionization for adult care workers is 13%, which is higher than the 
average for all workers, but lower than the rate for other health care professionals.292 By 
2010, over 400,000 care workers had joined unions.293 In the service sector, unionization 
is estimated to generate a 10.1% wage premium, amounting to about $2.00 per hour, 
and unionized home care aids and home health aides earn higher salaries than their non-
unionized counterparts.294 This is an important counterbalance to the 6% wage penalty 
associated with care work.295 Yet collective bargaining remains absent in most states and at 
the federal level,296 and the domestic worker rights movement faces ongoing pushback.297 
286  Boris & Klein, supra note 278, at 16.
287  Id. at 16–17.
288  Bapat, supra note 283, at 131–32; Boris & Klein, supra note 278, at 184–86. See also id. at 149–81 
(describing union organizing and accomplishments in the 1980s despite Reagan era pushback).
289  Bapat, supra note 283, at 132.
290  Id.; Boris & Klein, supra note 278, at 214–15 (these states include Oregon, Washington, Illinois, 
Massachusetts, and Missouri).
291  Boris & Klein, supra note 278, at 208–09.
292  Howes et al., supra note 279, at 74.
293  Boris & Klein, supra note 278, at 5.
294  Nancy Folbre, Candace Howes & Carrie Leana, A Care Policy and Research Agenda, in For Love and 
Money, supra note 277, at 197–98.
295  Howes et al., supra note 279, at 72.
296  Bapat, supra note 283, at 134.
297  Id. at 180–81.
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In Harris v. Quinn,298 the Supreme Court further halted this movement’s progress. 
B. Background of the Case
In 2003 Illinois passed a law declaring that personal assistants were public employees 
of the state for the purposes of coverage under the state’s Public Labor Relations Act 
(“PLRA”).299 This meant that personal assistants could collectively bargain for better 
working conditions. Personal assistants are funded by the federal Medicaid program to 
provide in-home caretaking services to “customers” (i.e., individuals with disabilities) 
whose conditions would otherwise require institutionalization.300 The purpose of the law 
was to designate a single union as the representative of personal assistants for collective 
bargaining purposes.301 Under the resulting collective bargaining agreement, all personal 
assistants who were not union members were required to pay a “fair share” of union dues.302 
Pamela Harris and several other personal assistants, represented by the anti-union group 
the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, sued the state and the union arguing 
that the PLRA violates their First Amendment rights by requiring them to pay a fee to a 
union that they do not support.303 Illinois prevailed before the district court and the Seventh 
Circuit.304 Before the Supreme Court, a 5-4 majority ruled against the state, striking down 
the fee requirement as violating the First Amendment’s free association rights.
C. The Majority Opinion
In the decision striking down the union fee requirement, Justice Alito distinguished 
prior Court precedent holding that a state can require all its employees to pay union dues305 
298  Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
299  Id. at 2626.
300  Id. at 2624.
301  Id. at 2626 (citing 2003 Ill. Laws 1930).
302  Id. at 2626.
303  Harris v. Quinn, 2010 WL 4736500 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2010).
304  Id.; Harris v. Quinn, 656 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2011).
305  Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. at 2630–38. The case is Abood v. Detroit Bd. Of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
Prior Court precedent had already established that fees paid by non-union members cannot go toward lobbying 
or political activity. See Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991) and cases cited therein.
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in order to prevent “non-members from free-riding on the union’s efforts” and to promote 
labor harmony by giving the state a single party with whom to negotiate.306 Justice Alito 
contended that these principles did not apply to the Illinois personal assistants because 
they were not “full-fledged” public sector employees, but rather, only “partial-public” 
employees.307 In so doing, he created a new “separate-but-unequal” category in the Court’s 
labor jurisprudence.308 Justice Alito reasoned that the personal assistants worked directly 
for “customers” who retained the authority to hire, supervise, and fire them. 
Having distinguished controlling precedent, Justice Alito concluded that the 
impingement on the dissenters’ First Amendment rights, i.e., the right not to support a 
union, was not outweighed by any compelling state interest.309 Any asserted interest in 
labor peace was illusory given that personal assistants spend their time in private homes 
and thus presumably could not organize effectively enough to disrupt state operations.310 
Moreover, the unions could advocate for improvements in the welfare of personal 
assistants even without the union dues provision.311 As explained below, the decision and 
its characterization of care workers rested on gender stereotypes, inaccurate conceptions of 
the care work market, and class-based discrimination against low-wage workers. 
 
D. The Court’s Market Assumptions
The Harris decision, one of several in recent years to weaken unions,312 devalues 
care work, and in so doing, undermines the quality of life for both care workers and care 
306  Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2627.
307  Id. at 2638.
308  See Kathleen Geier, Sarah Jaffe & Sheila Bapat, What Do The Recent Supreme Court Decisions Mean 
for Women’s Economic Security, Nation: Curve Blog (July 17, 2014) (comments of Kathleen Geier), http://
www.thenation.com/blog/180685/what-do-recent-supreme-court-decisions-mean-womens-economic-security 
[https://perma.cc/SWM7-8TC8].
309  Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2639–40. For a critique of the Court’s First Amendment analysis and its failure 
to acknowledge the First Amendment rights of unions and union members, see generally Catherine L. Fisk & 
Margaux Poueymirou, Harris v. Quinn and the Contradictions of Compelled Speech, 48 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 
439 (2015).
310  Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2640.
311  Id. at 2641.
312  See Gilman, supra note 12, 418–20 (discussing Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 
2277 (2012)). But see infra note 366 and accompanying text.
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recipients—both of whom are disproportionately female.313 Women live longer than 
men and are more likely to need care. At the same time, women dominate the paid care 
workforce due to gendered norms of altruism, discrimination in the job market, and social 
expectations.314 The Harris Court’s anachronistic assumptions about the value of low-wage 
workers and women’s work coalesce to reinforce the invisibility of care workers. 
The Harris decision clings to this private-public binary, even though care workers 
straddle the boundaries by working in the home. Women have long provided care to 
children, the disabled, and the elderly for no pay, based on the belief and social norm that 
women should provide care out of love.315 As a result, care work is typically not considered 
“real” work,316 as assuming altruism “reduces the need to worry about disparate human 
capital investments made within the family.”317 Yet the economic contribution made by 
unpaid care workers is massive and estimated at between $354 and $450 billion per year.318 
Of course, our economic system neither measures nor credits unpaid care work within 
the family.319 The results of women’s traditional care-taking role have been economic 
dependence on men and a persistent labor market disadvantage.320 Further, in taking time 
off to care for family members, women workers suffer a “care penalty” in lost wages and 
less professional advancement.321 Nevertheless, the majority’s core economic assumption 
here is that low care prices reflect an efficient market.
By contrast, the dissenters understood why personal assistants qualify as public 
employees, falling comfortably within prior precedent. Among other things, the state 
313  Folbre et al., supra note 294, at 187.
314  Paula England, Nancy Folbre & Carrie Leana, Motivating Care, in For Love and Money, supra note 
277, at 21, 36; England & Folbre, supra note 117, at 62.
315  Bapat, supra note 283, at 18; England & Folbre, supra note 117, at 74–75 (“The Western intellectual 
tradition has traditionally assumed that women naturally provide care for others, especially dependents.”).
316  Nelson, supra note 86, at 62 (explaining how orthodox neoclassical economics excludes caring).
317  Silbaugh, supra note 120, at 338, 346.
318  Folbre, supra note 280, at 92, 103.
319  Nancy Folbre, Introduction, in For Love and Money, supra note 277, at xi; Chuang, supra note 279, at 
1634 (“Labeling housework as ‘care’ signals that work in the home is divorced from economic entitlements.”).
320  England & Folbre, supra note 117, at 61.
321  Suzanne Bianchi, Nancy Folbre & Douglas Wolf, Unpaid Care Work, in For Love and Money, supra 
note 277, at 40, 58–59.
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sets the terms of employment for the personal assistant workforce, determines and pays 
their wages and benefits, establishes the job’s basic qualifications, describes the services 
a personal assistant may provide, and prescribes the terms of the employment contracts 
entered into between personal assistants and customers.322 At the same time, customers 
have the authority to manage their own day-to-day relationships with caregivers. Personal 
assistants thus have two employers, each of whom controls certain aspects of their work. 
Unlike the majority, which squeezed care workers into the private side of the work divide, 
the dissent was attuned to the triangular relationship between care workers, their customers, 
and the state that arises due to the personalized nature of the service provided and the 
requirements that attach to a government-funded program.323 One commentator pointed out 
the irony that plaintiff Pamela Harris cared for her disabled son, making him his mother’s 
boss in the Court’s cramped reading of the employment relationship.324 
In recognizing the permeability between public and private, Justice Kagan’s dissent, 
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor,325 reflected feminist understandings 
of the home and the workplace. Feminists have long attacked the artificial boundaries 
between public and private that legal systems and social norms historically upheld.326 In 
the traditional view, the public domain was the world of markets and politics, where men 
322  Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2646–47 (2014).
323  Folbre et al., supra note 294, at 187.
324  Sarah Jaffe, SCOTUS’ Real, Demented Agenda: Why Harris and Hobby Lobby Spell Disaster for 
Working Women, Salon (July 1, 2014), http://www.salon.com/2014/07/01/scotus_real_demented_agenda_
why_harris_and_hobby_lobby_spell_disaster_for_working_women/ [https://perma.cc/7QMN-4R8Y]. She 
adds: “One would not assume that the patient in a hospital is the ultimate employer of the nurse who cares 
for them, but in this case, it seems, the patient is assumed to be the boss.” Id. In Long Island Care at Home, 
Ltd. v. Coke, the Court upheld a regulation providing that home health care workers who work for third-party 
employers and who provide “companionship services” to the elderly were exempt from the wage and hour 
protections of the Fair Labor Standards Act. In so doing, the Court favored the interests of consumers of care 
over the providers of care, even though consumers benefit from a skilled, fairly paid workforce. Long Island 
Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158 (2007); see Peggie R. Smith, Who Will Care for the Elderly? The 
Future of Home Care, 61 Buff. L. Rev. 323, 331–37 (2013). The Department of Labor under President Obama 
passed a regulation to overturn this narrow interpretation of FLSA, 78 Fed. Reg. 60,557, and the D.C. Circuit 
upheld the regulation against challenge, Home Care Ass’n of America v. Weil, 799 F.3d 1084 (D.C. Cir. 2015), 
cert. denied 2016 WL 3461581 (2016).
325  Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2644.
326  See Tracy E. Higgins, Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing, 75 Chi.-Kent L. 
Rev. 847, 847 (2000).
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dominated and women were excluded.327 By contrast, the private domain consisted of home 
and family.328 Yet as feminists pointed out, privacy within families left men free to dominate, 
and even abuse, women and children because of their dependence on men for social goods 
and a lack of state intervention into the private realm.329 Feminists recognized that state 
inaction in the private realm is not neutral, because the state sets the legal ground rules that 
permit private inequality to flourish unchecked.330 Furthermore, feminists contended that 
the idea of private autonomy within the home was a myth for women, who are enmeshed 
in family relationships.331
Paid care work, such as that performed by the personal assistants in Harris, is 
motivated by both emotional connection and money.332 It does not fit into tidy market-based 
assumptions about self-interest. As feminist economists have noted, care is an “activity 
that conspicuously violates the standard assumptions made regarding the motivation of 
‘rational economic man’—dispassionate pursuit of narrow self-interest.”333 Regardless 
of motivation, “whether performed by a family member or by an employee, [care work] 
supports and subsidizes all other productive work.”334 The Harris court does not see the 
contributions to capital made by care workers, instead pushing them deeper into the privacy 
of the home where, as tradition dictates, they remain isolated.335 In other words, the Harris 
court resurrects a public–private divide that limits women’s economic independence and 
traps some women in poverty. 
327  See Suzanne A. Kim, Reconstructing Family Privacy, 57 Hastings L.J. 557, 568–69 (2006) (summarizing 
the public-private dichotomy).
328  Id. at 568–69.
329  See Higgins, supra note 326, at 850–51; Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative 
and Privacy, 105 Yale L.J. 2117, 2118 (1996); see also Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the 
Family 128–29 (1989).
330  See Frances Olson, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 
1497, 1502, 1506 (1983); Okin, supra note 329, at 111.
331  See generally Martha Fineman, The Neutered Mother, The Sexual Family, and Other 
Twentieth Century Tragedies 186–89 (1995); Robin West, The Difference in Women’s Hedonic Lives: 
A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 15 Wis. Women’s L.J. 149, 151–52 (1987); Robin 
West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1 (1988).
332  England et al., supra note 314, at 21.
333  England & Folbre, supra note 117, at 63.
334  Bapat, supra note 283, at 17–18.
335  Id. at 19 (citing early feminists).
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E. Devaluation of Care Workers
The Court’s opinion also reflects long-held biases against domestic workers.336 As 
Gloria Steinem has written, “categories of work are less likely to be paid by the expertise 
they require—or even by the importance to the community or to the mythical free market—
than by the sex, race and class of most of their workers.”337 This is evident when comparing 
the wages paid to men and women for performing the same work. Moreover, care workers 
carry the stigma of handling intimate and “dirty” tasks related to bodily processes.338 
The diminished valuation of care work stretches back to slavery, when Black women 
performed unpaid domestic work while working under conditions of extreme cruelty.339 
The “profession” of home care arose during the New Deal as government funding was 
made available to help families dealing with illness and old age; the providers of this care 
were mostly African American women who had previously worked in domestic service.340 
In other words, the undeserving poor—single mothers of color—were funneled to care for 
the deserving poor—children, the elderly, and the disabled.341 
At the same time, the New Deal codified prejudices against working women and people 
of color. Congress specifically excluded domestic workers, along with agricultural workers, 
from labor protections in the Fair Labor Standards Act, the National Labor Relations 
Act, and the Social Security Act.342 Most historians contend that these exclusions, which 
primarily impacted Black workers and women, were necessary in order to gain support 
from Southern congressmen, whose state economies were built on the backs of cheap labor 
provided by Black workers.343 While the Social Security Act has since been amended to 
include domestic workers,344 these workers remain outside the purview of the National 
336  Boris & Klein, supra note 278, at 8; Bapat, supra note 283, at 20 (citing Gloria Steinem).
337  Gloria Steinem, ‘Valuing Women’s Work,’ Moyers & Company (Mar. 30, 2012), http://billmoyers.com/
content/valuing-womens-work/ [https://perma.cc/3J8H-LBV6].
338  Boris & Klein, supra note 278, at 8.
339  Bapat, supra note 283, at 21.
340  Id. at 11.
341  Id. at 12.
342  See id. at 52–61 (describing statutory history). 
343  Id. at 55.  
344  Social Security was amended to cover domestic workers in 1950 (if certain earning thresholds and days 
of work for a single employer were met) and again in 1954 (eliminating the days worked for a single employer 
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Labor Relations Act, which provides employees with the rights to organize and collectively 
bargain to improve the conditions of employment.345 In 2014, the Obama Administration 
finally included most domestic workers within the scope of the FLSA’s overtime and 
minimum wage protections, and the D.C. Circuit upheld the regulation against a challenge 
by the home health care industry.346 A different administration could repeal the rule.
 
Moreover, domestic workers are outside the purview of federal employment 
discrimination statutes, which generally apply only to larger employers of a defined size, 
and since many care workers work for small employers or are considered independent 
contractors, they remain uncovered.347 Further, there is a large “grey” market in which 
under-the-table work arrangements leave many care workers without legal protection.348 
In sum, the current low status of care workers results from a history of “racialized labor 
markets, the location of care as welfare services, and the political and legal structures 
that sustain low wages and inhibit quality access.”349 These gaps are the reason that 
Illinois stepped in to protect personal assistants. Yet Harris overturns the decision of a 
democratically accountable branch that sought to correct for market imperfections and laws 
that undervalued care work. The Court substituted its own inaccurate market assumptions 
about what is best for consumers, i.e., low prices. In so doing, the Court reflects and 
reinforces biases about and against domestic workers.
requirement). Thus, most domestic workers are now covered. 42 U.S.C. §410(j)(3).
345  The NLRA does not include any individual employed “in the domestic service of any family or person 
at his home.” 29 U.S.C. §152(3).
346  See supra note 324 and citations therein.
347  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e (West 2016) (covered employers are defined 
as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working 
day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks” in the year); Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §2611 
(West 2016) (provides for up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave for health conditions or to care for a new child, 
but does not cover employers with fewer than forty employees); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§12111(5)(a) (West 2016) (prohibits employers from discriminating against disabled employees, but it applies 
only to employers who have “15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar 
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year”); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §630(b) 
(West 2016) (protects employees over forty years old, but covers only employers who have “twenty or more 
employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar 
year.”).
348  Folbre et al., supra note 294, at 199.
349  Boris & Klein, supra note 278, at 223–24.
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F. Impact
Domestic workers are not the only losers in this decision. The Harris decision harms 
customers and the state as well. As the dissent pointed out, in-home care programs were 
long plagued by workforce shortages and high turnover, due to low wages and a lack of 
benefits.350 In turn, this labor instability lowered the quality of care and pushed the disabled 
into more expensive institutions.351 These are systemic problems far beyond the ability of 
any individual customer or worker to solve; rather, the state is the single employer with 
the ability to negotiate with a union representative to attack these problems. The state’s 
involvement improves the functioning of the home health care market. 
Moreover, there is empirical evidence that collective bargaining works for domestic 
workers. With the benefits of collective bargaining, home care assistants in Illinois “doubled 
their wages in less than 10 years, obtained state-funded health insurance, and benefitted from 
better training and workplace safety measures.”352 At the same time, customers received 
better care, and the state got a more stable workforce and saved money.353 The irony of 
the majority decision, as the dissent pointed out, is that it “penalizes the State for giving 
disabled persons some control over their own care.”354 Harris represents an endorsement 
of individual rights over collective action. Like Hobby Lobby, it rules that health care is an 
individual responsibility rather than a social one, despite the reality of our interconnected 
relationships.355
So, if customers, personal assistants, and the state are all harmed by the Harris 
decision, who benefits? One beneficiary is the home health care industry, which is largely 
for-profit. The industry is one of the top five growing franchises in the country, with the 
top franchises grossing over $1 million annually with gross margins of 30–40%.356 Profits 
350  Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2648 (2014).
351  Id.
352  Id. 
353  Id. 
354  Id. at 2650.
355  Jaffe, supra note 324.
356  See Carol Tice, Best Franchises to Own: Why Home Healthcare is Hot, Forbes (May 27, 2014), http://
www.forbes.com/sites/caroltice/2014/05/27/best-franchises-home-healthcare-is-hot/; Kelly Kennedy, Home 
Health Care is One of the Most Profitable Franchises, USA Today (May 7, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.
com/money/industries/health/story/2012-05-03/home-health-care-a-profitable-franchise/54813562/1 [https://
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grew 9% a year from 2001 to 2009.357 A major study of Medicare-funded home health 
care found that for-profit agencies deliver lower-quality care even though operating costs 
were 18% higher, and thus, the authors questioned whether for-profit agencies should be 
allowed to remain eligible for Medicare reimbursements.358 A 2009 study by the National 
Private Duty Association found that businesses charge clients twice as much as they pay 
employees, prompting an employee advocate to comment that the industry simply does not 
have the overhead to justify such low wages.359 If the Harris majority was so concerned 
with rising state costs—notably, it cited to a report entitled the The Trouble with Public 
Sector Unions360—it might consider other sources for cost savings than the pockets of 
domestic workers.
The other winner in this fight is the anti-union, “right to work” movement, which is 
funded by conservatives such as the Koch brothers, and which spends millions to lobby 
state and federal governments and to bring litigation to limit union power.361 Their policy 
positions benefit big business at the expense of workers and consumers.362 In the end, low-
paid workers are pitted against vulnerable care recipients while private industry cashes 
its checks. Of course, customers with means can opt out of this publicly-funded market 
into a private one, which offers greater quality, choice, and control.363 The middle-class is 
particularly squeezed, as they have fewer employer benefits and earn too much for means-
perma.cc/75JQ-NRJM]. 
357  See Amy Traub, Hard Work Doesn’t Pay for Home-Care Workers, Am. Prospect (Mar. 22, 2012), http://
prospect.org/article/hard-work-doesnt-pay-home-care-workers [https://perma.cc/GLR5-TJ57].
358  William Cabin et al., For-Profit Medicare Home Health Agencies’ Costs Appear Higher and Quality 
Appears Lower Compared to Nonprofit Agencies, 33 Health Affairs 1460, 1460–65 (2014), http://content.
healthaffairs.org/content/33/8/1460.abstract [https://perma.cc/TSY9-6W35].
359  See Kennedy, supra note 356. 
360  Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2632 n.7 (2014).
361  See Jay Riestenberg & Mary Bottari, Who Is Behind the National Right to Work Committee and its 
Anti-Union Crusade?, PR Watch (June 3, 2014), http://www.prwatch.org/news/2014/06/12498/who-behind-
national-right-work-committee-and-its-anti-union-crusade [https://perma.cc/VU5R-X6T6] (noting that the 
National Right to Work Committee spent over $33 million on lobbying between 1999 and 2013).
362  Ed Pilkington, Wisconsin Anti-union Bill is ‘Word for Word’ From Rightwing Lobbyist Group, Guardian 
(Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/feb/23/wisconsin-right-to-work-bill-scott-walker-
alec [https://perma.cc/BJY5-RGEL] (a right to work bill passed in Wisconsin in 2015 was taken verbatim from 
a model bill framed by a pro-business lobbying group called ALEC).
363  Janet Gornick et al., The Disparate Impacts of Care Policy, in For Love & Money, supra note 277, at 
141, 178.
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tested programs such as Medicaid.364 These income disparities splinter women by class and 
lessen opportunities for alliances.
The most direct impact of Harris is that the 20,000 personal assistants in Illinois may 
lose employment protections if the union, losing fees from non-members, cannot afford 
to negotiate effectively on their behalf. As a practical matter, it will be very difficult for 
the union to gather voluntary dues now that it has to go door-to-door to each individual 
workplace.365 Harris also portends a tough road for unions in other Supreme Court 
challenges, as the Court indicated a strong desire to overrule existing precedent altogether. 
Unions scored a reprieve, perhaps temporary, when a 4-4 Court in Friedrichs v. California 
Teachers Association split on the constitutionality of agency fees for public employee 
unions, thus leaving the Ninth Circuit’s decision upholding agency fees intact.366 Low-
wage workers are especially vulnerable to attacks on workers’ rights, but their losses often 
spread to the larger workplace.367 
 
In addition, Harris stalls the momentum of today’s most vibrant pro-worker movement. 
As a result, it is more important than ever for domestic workers to organize outside the 
formal union structures. For instance, in New York, a multi-ethnic and multicultural array 
of groups of domestic workers and their supporters, including care work employers, 
advocated for enactment of the New York Domestic Worker Bill of Rights in 2010—the 
first in the nation—which guarantees overtime, paid rest days, and meal and rest breaks 
for domestic workers.368 Similar laws have passed in California and Hawaii, and activists 
have been building momentum in other states as well.369 Sheila Bapat writes about similar 
alt-labor movement strategies, such as worker centers and online organizing that operate 
outside the formal labor framework and thus might have greater chances for sustainable 
success.370 
364  Id. at 142, 178.
365  See Jaffe, supra note 324.
366  Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016) (per curiam). There were only eight votes due 
to the death of Justice Scalia.
367  See Jaffe, supra note 324.
368  Bapat, supra note 283, at 65–80.
369  Id. at 96–97 (California); 105–07 (Hawaii); 99–110 (other states). Bapat queries whether collective 
bargaining is “the right strategy.” Id. at 136–41.  
370  Id. at 136–47; see also Boris & Klein, supra note 278, at 221–22.  
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V. Reflections and Remedies
 
The core insights of feminist economics are borne out in the Supreme Court decisions 
impacting working class women and their families. To begin with, the Court devalues 
care work and reinforces gendered stereotypes about women’s role in the home and 
market. Harris treats care workers as less valuable than other workers; Wal-Mart permits 
employers to make gendered assumptions about the career trajectories of workers based 
on women’s care responsibilities; and Hobby Lobby limits the ability of women workers 
to make decisions about their family size, and thus, to control their care obligations. These 
decisions tell women that they should engage in care work for no pay or low pay, that 
women’s care obligations are fair grounds for limiting professional opportunities, and 
that women—not society—are individually responsible for caring for dependent family 
members.
Moreover, these Court decisions prioritize corporate conceptions of efficiency over 
human well-being or other ethical values, even though there is nothing “intrinsic in the 
economic or legal structure of commerce that forces firms, inexorably, as if run on rails, 
to neglect values of care and concern in order to strive for every last dollar of profits.”371 
The Wal-Mart decision entrenches subjective personnel practices that harm women while 
insulating management; Hobby Lobby elevates the religious preferences of a handful of 
capital owners over the health needs and religious preferences of thousands of female 
employees; and Harris hands anti-union forces a win in lieu of improving the quality of 
care for the ill or the conditions for workers. These decisions evidence no concern with the 
quality of life for female workers or their families.
In addition, the Court fails to acknowledge or understand the day-to-day reality 
of women’s lives at the intersection of class, race, and gender. For the most part, real 
women are absent from these Court decisions, unless they are spoken of disparagingly.372 
Meanwhile, corporations are imbued with sympathetic human characteristics. The Court 
majority suggests that no rational Wal-Mart manager would ever discriminate and that 
371  Nelson, supra note 86, at 73.
372  For instance, the Wal-Mart majority goes out of its way to impugn the credibility of the three 
named plaintiffs, two of whom were Black, by describing their alleged wrongdoing as employees—
facts which are irrelevant to a class certification decision. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 
S. Ct. 2541, 2547–48 (2011). Judicial attacks on the credibility of female litigants are common. 
See Leigh Goodmark, Telling Stories, Saving Lives: The Battered Mothers’ Testimony Project, 
Women’s Narratives, and Court Reform, 37 Ariz. St. L.J. 709, 732 (2005); Lynn Hecht 
Schafran, Credibility in the Courts: Why Is There a Gender Gap?, 34 Judge J. 5, 8 (1995).
Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 5732.1
Hobby Lobby’s owners are a tight-knit family who built their business from scratch. By 
contrast, the dissents’ authors are both women who show empathy and understanding of the 
social and legal barriers facing women in the low-wage workforce and how those barriers 
are compounded by class.
Finally, in each case, the Court strikes down collective action to uphold the status quo. 
Wal-Mart rejected the class action litigation brought by female employees; Hobby Lobby 
overturned a legislative consensus to provide women with contraception; and Harris 
similarly overturned a hard-fought law to permit collective bargaining by care workers. The 
conservative Court majority claims to be scornful of judicial activism,373 but eagerly strikes 
down legislatively-enacted worker protections in order to preserve corporate prerogatives. 
The Court’s attack on collective action to better the lives of women is perhaps the most 
disturbing pattern in these cases. 
These decisions reinforce gender-based economic inequality. The subjective 
employment practices that depress women’s wages (Wal-Mart), the loss of contraceptive 
options that limit women’s economic mobility (Hobby Lobby), and the low wages that occur 
without collective bargaining (Harris) are all factors that contribute to the gender wage 
gap, women’s poverty, lower workforce participation rates for women, and a permanent 
class of low-wage workers with limited opportunities for advancement. None of the cases 
have outcomes that will advance women’s economic mobility.
Where do we go from here? These cases—each of which was decided on a narrow 5-4 
vote—demonstrate the importance of Supreme Court nominees and in turn, the importance 
of presidential election outcomes. The recent death of Justice Scalia has highlighted the 
significance of a single vote on a closely divided Court and how his replacement could affect 
the balance of decision-making for decades.374 Given that the president nominates justices, 
373  See Sheldon Whitehouse, Conservative Judicial Activism: The Politicization of the Supreme Court 
Under Chief Justice Roberts, 9 Harv. L. & Pol’y Rev. 195, 196 (2015) (describing Justice Roberts during his 
confirmation hearings claiming that he would be an “umpire” who would call “balls and strikes”) (internal 
quotations omitted). Cf. Keith E. Whittington, The Least Activist Supreme Court in History? The Roberts Court 
and the Exercise of Judicial Review, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2219, 2220 (2014) (“The Court in recent years has 
struck down federal laws in fewer cases than has its predecessors.”); Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Is the 
Roberts Court Especially Activist? A Study of Invalidating (and Upholding) Federal, State, and Local Laws, 
61 Emory L.J. 737, 737–38 (2012) (concluding that “liberal Justices tend to invalidate conservative laws and 
conservative Justices, liberal laws”).
374  Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html [https://perma.cc/PUC2-DDGE]. 
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it is clear that presidential elections matter for women’s equality.375 Thus, feminists must 
play a role in explaining the link between women’s work and the economy and supporting 
candidates who understand that connection.376  
That is just a beginning. In a prior article about economic inequality, I detailed 
several strategies for the economic justice lawyering movement,377 all of which would 
contribute to the economic security of women. To begin with, progressive lawyers need to 
continue developing theoretical and doctrinal frameworks centered on economic fairness, 
recognizing that both the Court’s composition and its views are fluid. Along these lines, 
we need to engage with other disciplines to build a social science record that reveals the 
connections between law, policy, and economic hardship. Accordingly, feminist legal 
and economic theorists should work together to continue developing theories and data 
that counter prevailing market narratives and explain the basis of social responsibility for 
vulnerability. Due to the Occupy Wall Street movement, workers’ rights organizing, and 
the increasing acknowledgment of economic inequality by policy makers, presidential 
candidates, and corporate titans alike, Americans are becoming increasingly aware of 
economic inequality and more likely to acknowledge structural, as opposed to individual, 
barriers to equality. Thus, the time is right to explain how the state shapes markets and how 
public policies can improve market outcomes for workers. 
In addition, progressive lawyers must align with workers’ rights and identity-based 
movements, such as those focused on race and gender, to build a broad-based, intersectional 
economic justice movement based on shared interests. The successes of the domestic 
worker rights movement (Harris v. Quinn notwithstanding), within and outside of formal 
labor structures, demonstrate that effective organizing can lead to better laws. Recently, 
in some jurisdictions, low-wage workers have successfully advocated for paid sick leave, 
higher minimum wages, and fair scheduling practices. At the same time, government is 
not the answer to all of the market’s deficiencies. Worker movements are having some 
success in pressuring employers directly to make changes. For instance, activism by fast-
food and retail workers has led some employers, such as McDonald’s, to pay wages above 
375  See Adam Liptak, How a Vacancy on the Supreme Court Affects Cases in the 2015-16 Term, N.Y. Times, 
Apr. 15, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/02/14/us/politics/how-scalias-death-could-affect-
major-supreme-court-cases-in-the-2016-term.html [https://perma.cc/ZH9H-9YEQ].
376  For a review of the gender politics in the 2012 presidential election, including how feminists fought a 
Republican assault on women’s rights and how President Obama connected economic and gender issues, see 
Michele Estrin Gilman, Feminism, Democracy, and the “War on Women,” 32 J.L. & Inequal. 1, 11–12 (2014).
377  Gilman, A Court for the One Percent, supra note 12, at 451–62.
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the legally-required minimum (although still not a living wage).378 Given that women 
are disproportionately represented in the service industry and low-wage workforce, this 
movement has the potential to decrease inequality. Workers are also exploring alternative 
legal structures, such as worker cooperatives, to become their own managers and owners 
and create workplaces that value their needs.379 The ability to “democratize the workplace” 
through “allocation of governance and profit-sharing rights” is “the most empowering in 
terms of control over one’s working environment.”380
Lawyers can help grassroots movements for economic justice by educating workers 
about legal rights, providing assistance in strategizing and organizing, drafting proposed 
bills and legal documents, and thinking creatively with grassroots advocates about how to 
adapt existing legal structures to benefit workers and women.381 In general, lawyers and their 
clients have a large toolbox to effectuate systemic change, including litigation, community 
organizing, legislative and administrative advocacy, civil disobedience, public education, 
and community education. For instance, E. Tammy Kim describes a model of community 
lawyering for low-wage workers in which lawyers “support community organizing 
through legal representation of members of external grassroots organizations.”382 The 
lawyers provide “legal assistance to resolve discrete legal problems and attack structural 
injustices,” while the workers and organizers identify the spaces where law can improve 
378  Melanie Hicken, McDonald’s is Giving 90,000 Workers a Pay Raise, CNN Monday (Apr. 2, 2015), 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/01/news/companies/mcdonalds-pay-raise/ [https://perma.cc/4893-AV6K]. It is 
also possible that these employers are trying to head off more drastic government action and/or worker unrest 
with modest raises.
379  See Ariana R. Levinson, Founding Worker Cooperatives: Social Movement Theory and the Law, 14 Nev. 
L.J. 322 (2014); Carmen Huertas-Noble, Promoting Worker-Owned Cooperatives as a CED Empowerment 
Strategy: A Case Study of Colors and Lawyering in Support of Participatory Decision-Making and Meaningful 
Social Change, 17 Clin. L. Rev. 255 (2010). Huertas-Noble describes a variety of community lawyering 
models. Id. at 257–61.
380  Huertas-Noble, supra note 379, at 264.
381  For instance, Huertas-Noble describes all the tasks lawyers perform in creating worker cooperatives, 
including researching legal models, counseling clients, forming legal entities, structuring entity relationships, 
drafting employment contracts, negotiating with lenders and investors, drafting loan documents, and the like. 
Id. at 273–74.
382  E. Tammy Kim, Lawyers as Resource Allies in Workers’ Struggles for Social Change, 13 N.Y. City L. 
Rev. 213, 220 (2009). Kim helpfully explains various models of lawyering for workers’ rights and summarizes 
the rich literature on community lawyering models. Id. at 218–21, 225. See also Loretta Price & Melinda 
Davis, Seeds of Change: A Bibliographic Introduction to Law and Organizing, 26 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. 
Change 615 (2000–2001).
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workers’ status.383 Relatedly, Sebastian Amar and Guy Johnson describe a model in which 
lawyers are paired with community organizers to serve immigrant communities.384 After 
immigrant care workers identify their legal needs, the lawyers document and formalize 
their grievances, negotiate with employers, and file suit where necessary.385 These and other 
community lawyering models provide insights and valuable lessons for lawyers working 
for workers’ rights.
Finally, we need to expand access to justice to ensure that the judicial system is 
responsive to the 99%. While this Article focuses on the Supreme Court, most Americans 
have contact with the judicial branch through lower-level courts and administrative 
agencies when they owe a debt, are part of a dissolving family, or are charged with 
committing a crime. Civil and criminal access to lawyers is limited, which denies people 
an effective voice and compounds economic inequality. Expanding access to justice is 
essential for achieving justice. In sum, there are multiple strategies for combating gender-
based economic equality; the fight will be multidimensional, collaborative, and long-term. 
Understanding the Supreme Court’s assumptions and reasoning with regard to women 
workers is a preliminary step in creating change.
CONCLUSION
Economic inequality is on the rise, with the harshest impacts falling on women and 
minorities. A key insight into understanding wealth and income disparities is that they 
are not the inevitable result of a competitive market. To the contrary, government creates 
the rules of the market. The Supreme Court is one of the players. In recent years, the 
Court has issued a series of decisions that harm women workers and their families while 
preserving corporate prerogatives. In these cases, the Court uncritically accepts simplified 
assumptions of neoclassical economics and reinforces gendered stereotypes about 
women’s work inside and outside the home. The Court devalues care work, promotes its 
view of efficiency over other values, upholds severe power imbalances in the workplace, 
and ignores the intersectional realities of the lives of low-wage women workers. Women 
workers are not passive; they have courageously organized to remove barriers to economic 
parity. However, the Court has stricken down a range of collective action on the part of 
women workers to obtain the same pay and opportunities as men (Wal-Mart); to have 
383  Kim, supra note 382, at 221.
384  Sebastian Amar & Guy Johnson, Here Comes the Neighborhood: Attorneys, Organizers, and Immigrants 
Advancing a Collaborative Vision of Justice, 13 N.Y. City L. Rev. 173, 176 (2009).  
385  Id. at 179.
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access to contraception and thereby control the size and timing of their families (Hobby 
Lobby Stores); and to collectively bargain for better working conditions (Harris). In the 
face of the Court’s erosion of collective action, any social movement for economic equality 
must grapple with the judiciary’s role in upholding unjust market outcomes and strategize 
around opportunities for reform. We currently have a Court for the 1%. We must advocate 
for a Court for all.
